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DYSFUNCTIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE LAWS
AND PRACTICES THAT ENABLE THEM:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

DEBRA POGRUND STARK*
DR. JESSICA M. CHOPLIN**
EILEEN LINNABERY***

INTRODUCTION

A review of purchase agreement forms used by condominium developers in
Chicago, Illinois from 2003-2008 (the "Condo Contracts Study"') discovered that
79% contained highly unfair, one-sided remedies clauses. Specifically, as
detailed in Part I, these forms provided that the buyer's sole remedy in the event
of the seller's breach was the return of the buyer's own earnest money.2 This is
not a meaningful remedy because it does not cover any of the losses buyers
would normally be entitled to under the law due to a breach of the contract,
creating-as one court put it--"heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" illusory agreements.3
In essence, these clauses constitute a waiver of the right to recover benefits of the
bargain/expectation damages, consequential damages, reliance-type damages, and

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Brandeis University, summa
cum laude; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law. The author thanks reference librarians
Anne Abramson and Jamie Sommer of The John Marshall Law School, and student researchers:
Caitlin Fitzpatrick, Cole Hardy, Olga Kamova, Kimberly Regan, Ian Rubenstruck, and Tanya
Sinclair, for their excellent research assistance. She also thanks Associate Dean Ruebner and Dean
Corkery of The John Marshall Law School for their support and summer grant for this Article.
** Associate Professor of Psychology, DePaul University. Ph.D. in Cognitive Psychology,
University of California, Los Angeles. Dr. Choplin received support during the writing of this
Article from a National Science Foundation grant (SES 1024435) awarded to Jessica M. Choplin
and Debra Pogrund Stark.
*** Graduate Student in Industrial/Organizational Psychology, DePaul University.
1. The Condo Contracts Study was based on a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request by Professor Stark of the City of Chicago to view all of the property reports filed by
developers of condominiums in Chicago, Illinois during 2003-2008 (attached as one of the exhibits
to each property report was a form purchase and sale contract for the condominium units that the
developer planned to use). Boxes of such filed property reports were made available to Debra
Stark's research assistants, and approximately twenty-five property reports (one report is issued for
each condo building) were randomly selected to review for each of those years for a total of 155
form purchase contracts from a base of 631 property reports. Debra Pogrund Stark et al., Condo
Contracts Study: Chicago, Illinois 2003-2008, which were accessed in 2009-2010 (on file with
author) [hereinafter Condo Contracts Study]. A detailed analysis of some of the other contracts
clauses reviewed under this study will appear in a future article.
2. See Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
3. Blue Lakes Apts., Ltd. v. George Gowing, Inc., 464 So. 2d 705, 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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the remedy of specific performance. Further compounding the unfairness of this
limited remedy clause is the fact that these same form contracts also provide the
seller with the ability to recover substantial damages in the event of the buyer's
breach. Typically, the contracts provided that for the buyer's breach of the
contract the seller could retain the buyer's deposit (usually an amount between
5-10% of the purchase price). 4 We argue that these overly one-sided remedies
clauses create "dysfunctional contracts" because one party, the more
sophisticated party (the seller/developer who drafted the form contract), can
willfully default and terminate the contract with no harm to that party. Hence,
the contract provides no true binding agreement from that party. Meanwhile,
under these contracts, the other party is bound and would suffer a material harm
if she failed to perform. Since the main function of entering into a contract is for
both parties to be bound through risk of exposure to negative consequences if
they breach, these form contracts are dysfunctional because they remove all
negative consequences for the sellers. Indeed, such contracts could be construed
as invalid and lacking in consideration because one of the party's promises are
illusory, a conclusion drawn by some courts in Florida, but one that courts in
otherjurisdictions have rejected.6 Courts in jurisdictions outside of Florida have
refused to strike down this type of liability limiting clause under the
unconscionability test due to the "clear" wording of these "bargained for"
clauses.7
But do laypersons really comprehend these clauses that appear to lawyers
and judges as clearly limiting liability? And if not, how does this impact, first,
the premise that the laypersons bargained for this result when they signed the
purchase agreement and, second, the application of the unconscionability test for
striking down a limitation of liability clause? This Article discusses a "Remedies
Experiment" 8 the authors ran which attempts to assess the layperson's
comprehension of the highly unfair limitation-of-remedy clauses found in so

4. See Condo Contracts Study, supranote 1; Blue Lakes Apts., Ltd., 464 So. 2d at 709.
5. Terminating the contract and returning the purchaser's earnest money is technically a
legal consequence of rescission and partial restitution, but it does not provide the buyer with a
recovery for the buyer's losses caused by the seller's breach, nor does it impose a loss on the seller
for terminating the contract or create a disincentive to engage in strategic defaults.
6. Compare Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (finding that limiting the purchaser's damages to the return of his deposit "render[ed] the
seller's obligation wholly illusory and would permit him to breach with impunity") andBlue Lakes
Apts., Ltd., 464 So. 2d at 709 (finding such clauses render the seller's obligations to be illusory),
with Tanglewood Land Co. v. Byrd, 256 S.E.2d 270, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (applying Virginia
law, the court held that if a seller fails to perform under a contract, the buyer may "sue for specific
performance or breach of contract," but unless it can be shown the seller acted in bad faith, the fact
that the seller's only obligation would be to refund the buyer's payment does not render the contract
illusory).
7. See infra Part III.
8. Debra Pogrund Stark et al., Consumer Remedies, Chicago, Illinois (2010-2011) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter Remedies Experiment]. See infra Part II.B.
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many real estate developer form contracts. We found that the results from our
experiment reflect a widespread failure of the participants to understand the
impact of this type of clause on their rights after a breach. These results undercut
the premise upon which the unconscionability test rests: that the home purchaser
understood the clearly worded limitation clause and therefore bargained for this
result.9 Thus, while many courts refuse to strike down these clauses under the
unconscionability test, this Article argues that the results from the Remedies
Experiment should lead courts to adopt a different set of tests for ruling on the
enforceability of limitation-of-remedy clauses in home purchase contracts.
Part I ofthis Article highlights the relevant results from two empirical studies
Professor Stark conducted regarding major problems with the fairness of
purchase agreement forms used by residential real estate developers in Illinois.
Part I also discusses the lack of home purchaser understanding of key relevant
laws and legal documents examined in an empirical study conducted by Professor
Michael Braunstein in Columbus, Ohio. I Part II of this Article contains a
detailed report of the results from the Remedies Experiment we ran." This
experiment demonstrated that, contrary to the assumption of many judges, even
after carefully reviewing limitation-of-remedies clauses, a very large percentage
of laypersons believed they were entitled to remedies that were "clearly" (at least
to an attorney or judge's eyes) excluded in the contract clause. In Part III, the
Article examines and critiques case law on the enforceability of these limitationof-remedies clauses noting the split of authority among the reported case law in
the United States on this issue and why Florida's approach of providing greater
protection to home purchasers is more appropriate. In Part IV, the Article
proposes four legal reforms to address the problem of dysfunctional contracts
that contain highly unfair and problematic remedies clauses.
I. HIGHLIGHTS FROM Two EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN ILLINOIS
AND AN EMPIRICAL STUDY IN COLUMBUS, OHIO

As previously noted, a key finding from Professor Stark's Chicago Condo
Contracts Study was that 79% of the form contracts reviewed contained terms
that provided no remedy to the condo purchaser to cover the purchaser's losses
due to the seller's breach or to deter the seller from strategic, willful defaults.12
At the same time, however, the seller/developer retained valuable remedies upon
default of the buyer's contractual obligations. 3
The form contracts
overwhelmingly contained a clause limiting the buyer's sole and exclusive
remedy in the event of the seller's breach to termination of the contract and

9. Tanglewood Land Co., 256 S.E.2d at 271 (determining the contract was supported by
consideration).
10. Michael Braunstein & Hazel Genn, Odd Man Out: PreliminaryFindingsConcerningthe
DiminishingRole ofLawyers in the Home-Buying Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 476-79 (1991).
11. See Remedies Experiment, supra note 8.
12. See Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
13. Id.
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return of the buyer's own earnest money (an obligation that would exist
regardless of the contract clause identifying it as the buyer's sole remedy 4). This
creates a waiver of other more meaningful remedies to address the seller's
breach, such as specific performance, benefit of the bargain, reliance, or
consequential damages, without explicitly setting forth these rights and saying
these rights are now waived. Only 4% of the sampled form contracts' remedies
clauses permitted the buyer to seek compensatory/bargain type remedies
available under the law in the event of the seller's default had the contract been
silent on the issue of remedies. 5 In the same form contracts, sellers were granted
the compensatory remedy of liquidated damages (in the form of retention of the
buyer's earnest money-typically under those contracts at somewhere between
5-10% of the purchase-price amount) in 68% of the contracts and were permitted
all available remedies in the event of the buyer's default in 23% of the
contracts. 16
Equally important to any limitation-of-remedies clause is how the contract
treats attorneys' fees for enforcing the agreement. Unless the contract provides
for attorneys' fees for the prevailing party, few buyers could afford to bring a
lawsuit to challenge the validity of a limitation-of-remedy clause because the
attorneys' fees are likely to be substantial, sometimes even exceeding their
damages claims. 7 According to the Condo Contracts Study, only 14% of the
contracts contained a provision entitling the prevailing party in a lawsuit relating
to a purchase contract to attorneys' fees.' 8 Therefore, in 86% of these form
contracts, the purchaser is far less able to bring a claim for specific performance
or damages and to challenge any applicable limitation-of-remedy clause when the
seller has breached the contract. 19
A survey of over one hundred attorneys in Illinois conducted by Stark
("Attorney Survey") also reflects the serious problems with remedies clauses in
condo purchase agreements found in the Condo Contracts Study."0 In the

14. Id. Generally, when a buyer deposits a sum of money with the seller, or with a third
party, it is with the express intent that it be used to pay a portion of the purchase price if the deal
is closed and serve as security if the buyer defaults. In fact, if the deal does not close due to the
seller's default or other reasons not the fault of the buyer, then the seller is obligated to repay that
amount of money to the buyer. See Kopis v. Savage, 498 N.E.2d 1266, 1269-72 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
15. Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. According to one source, fees associated with litigating a lawsuit range from 30-60% of
the total recovery. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWsUrr LOTrERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 86
(1979). When the claim involves a construction defect, experts are likely to be necessary, adding
to the typical costs of litigation.
18. See Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
19. Id. If the contract is silent on the recovery of attorneys' fees for a suit based on the
contract, the prevailing party is not entitled to an award of its attorney's fees unless there is an
applicable statute to the contrary. See infra note 81.
20. Debra Pogrund Stark, Illinois Real Estate Attorney Survey (circulated in 2010) (on file
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Attorney Survey, when asked in an open-ended question what terms in the condo
purchase contracts they have seen that were highly unfair or highly problematic,
51% referred to the limitation-of-liability to the seller or the limitation-ofremedies to the buyer as their chief concern.2 1 When asked to rate their level of
satisfaction with various terms in the condo purchase contracts they have seen,
in response to the remedies available to the buyer, 32% of surveyed attorneys
rated their level of satisfaction as "1" (with "I" being the lowest level of
satisfaction and "7" being the highest), another 22% rated it with a "2," 15%
rated it with a "3," leaving only a total of 29% who rated it with a "4" or better.22
In addition, when asked, "To what extent do you think a buyer, unrepresented by
an attorney, would have read the form contract, realized that they should have
raised the same important changes you would, and would then be able to raise
these points with the seller," 69.6% of the attorneys surveyed reported a "7," and
92.1% reported either a "6" or "7" (on a 1-7 scale) that they felt strongly that
they did not think they (the buyers) would raise the same points. 23 The results of
the Remedies Experiment we ran in connection with spotting problems with the
unfair remedies clauses of the contract supports this opinion. 24 These results
suggest a need for homebuyers to have an attorney represent the homebuyer at
the contract formation/negotiation stage or under an attorney approval of the
contract clause. It should also be noted that only 35% of the attorneys reported
that they were successful in negotiating a modification or deletion of highly
unfair or problematic terms contained in the developer's form contract greater
than 50% of the time.25 As Part IV of the Article discusses, this result suggests
the need to create legislation prohibiting the most unfair and problematic terms
developers use in their form contracts, especially ones that laypersons do not
understand. Finally, we asked attorneys to report how often major disputes arose
between the parties after the contract was signed (before or after closing the
deal).26 Approximately half of respondents (50.5%) reported that such major
disputes arose in only 1-10% of the matters they handled, with only 3.8%
reporting experiencing such major disputes more than 50% of the time but only

with author) [hereinafter Attorney Survey]. The Attorney Survey was based upon dissemination
of an online survey designed to elicit the opinions and experiences of Illinois real estate attorneys
regarding residential real estate form contracts prepared by developers with a focus on the level of
fairness of the terms to buyers and ability of the lawyers to negotiate for better terms, but covering
other related matters. The form was sent to members of the Illinois State Bar Association and the
Chicago Bar Association, various residential real estate attorneys who had listings on Lawyers.com,
alumni of The John Marshall Law School, and real estate lawyers located on the MartindaleHubbell directory. In total, 108 lawyers submitted responses to the survey. A detailed analysis of
the Attorney Survey will appear in a future article.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Remedies Experiment, supranote 8.
25. Attorney Survey, supra note 20.
26. Id.
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9.7% reporting they never had a major dispute arise after the contract was
signed.2 7 The fact that most reported such a low percentage of maj or disputes (110%) may explain why the Special Master in New Jersey noted no evidence of
public harm from having homebuyers unrepresented by attorneys.2" But this
Article disagrees, first, with the belief that it is acceptable even if 1-10% of
homebuyers have no remedies when the seller has breached a home purchase
contract, and, second, that it does not pose a public harm worthy of state
intervention. For example, most states require automobile drivers to obtain
casualty insurance due to the likelihood that drivers will, at some point, be
involved in a car accident, and motorists must be insured to pay for any damage
inflicted on other motorists.29 One might imagine that a very large percentage of
claims are filed each year; yet in 2011, only 1% of policyholders brought bodily
injury claims, and the average amount paid on those claims was $14,848.3 o Only
5% of policyholders brought a claim for collision damages, and the average
amount paid on these claims was only $2869. Similarly, it is the practice of
mortgage lenders, and a requirement for FHA insured loans, to require that the
borrower obtain casualty insurance on the home as a condition to obtaining the
loan.3 Yet, in 2008 only 6% of insured homeowners filed a claim (97% of
claims were for property damage, including theft) on their homeowner's
insurance policies.32 Even though the percentage of insurance claims filed for car
insurance and home damage ranges from 1-10%, federal and state laws still
require insurance coverage in these areas. Likewise, this Article argues that state
laws should require specially trained and licensed attorneys to represent
homebuyers at the contract formation stage. Such representation provides a type
of "insurance" because the attorneys can review the contract, spot problems, and
negotiate changes to the contract to address those problems, consequently placing
homebuyers in a far better position when major disputes arise in 1-10% of the
deals. If unable to negotiate for changes to address the problems, the lawyer will
make the buyer aware of the risks, and some buyers may choose not to proceed
with the deal and seek out a safer alternative.3 3

27. Id.

28. In re Opinion No. 26 of Comm., 654 A.2d 1344, 1345 (N.J. 1995) (per curiam).
29. Harvey Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 69, 70
(1998).
30. Auto Insurance,INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts-statistics/auto-insurance.html
(last visited June 29, 2013).
31. See Kenneth S. Klein, Following the Money--The Chaotic Kerfuffle When Insurance
Proceeds SimultaneouslyAre the Only RebuildFunds and the Only Mortgage Collateral,46 CAL.
W. L. REv. 305, 306 (2010) ("A standard condition of mortgages or, more precisely, the security
instruments accompanying mortgages in the United States is that the borrower must have casualty
insurance protecting not just the borrower, but also the bank." (internal parentheses omitted)).
32. Homeowners andRentersInsurance,INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts statistics!
homeowners-and-renters-insurance.html (last visited June 16, 2013).
33. The area of major dispute most reported in the Attorney Survey was the physical
condition of the home (86%), followed by failure to complete on time (58.1%), failure of a
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There is another empirical study on the impact of attorney representation in
home purchases that has relevant findings. In Braunstein's 1989 study, noted
earlier, recent purchasers of homes near Columbus, Ohio, were interviewed in
lengthy telephone conversations.34 Of the 132 homebuyers surveyed, 41% had
hired an attorney to represent them in some capacity of the purchase, and the rest
had not.35 He noted that "many of those who hired a lawyer" did so where "the
lawyer was involved fairly early in the process," but it is not clear if this refers
to the time the contract was being negotiated.36 When asked why they hired a
lawyer, the most frequent response was a vague "to protect me" answer,
apparently without any further details.37 Braunstein notes several areas where the
purchasers failed to understand basic real estate laws as applied to their deal: (i)
"50[%] did not know whether their deed was a general warranty deed, a limited
warranty deed, a quit claim deed, or some other type," (which impacts liability
of the seller to the buyer for defects in title and encumbrances); (ii) although
many knew they had taken title as joint tenants (only 22.6% did not know how
they took title), almost 50% of those who knew they took asjoint tenants "did not
know the significance of how they held title" (such as rights of survivorship,
which might not be what the buyers intended if, for example, it is the couple's
second marriage and there are children from the first marriage); and (iii) a large
percentage of buyers displayed a substantial lack of understanding of title
insurance, with "only 7% realiz[ing] that there were any exceptions to their
policy," and over half not realizing "that title insurance did not cover faulty
construction, but did cover adverse legal claims to the house and land."38 Equally
problematic is the fact that an "overwhelming majority of buyers were not given
a copy of the title policy until at or after the closing"39 when it is difficult or too
late to address title problems disclosed in the title commitment. Some of the
home buyers also did not realize that the real estate agent's loyalty was to the
seller, and not the buyer, unless the agent was the buyer's agent or a dual agent.4 °
These results reflect that the homebuyers were ignorant of important legal
matters relating to their home purchases, suggesting that the buyers should be
represented by an attorney who is aware of these matters and able to ensure that
the buyer's goals and expectations are met. Having said that, a disturbing finding
from the telephone interviews was that purchasers who used lawyers were no
more educated on relevant legal matters, no more content with the exchange, and
no more likely to deflect disagreement than those who did not hire
representation. 4' These results show poor diligence by the attorneys who

condition
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

to close (44.1%), breach of contract (37.6%), title defects (35.5%), and other (12.9%).
Braunstein & Genn, supra note 10, at 469.
Id. at471.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id. at 479-80.
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represented those home buyers42 and the authors here contend underscore the
need for attorneys who practice in this area of law to be specially trained and
licensed in order provide real value to their clients.43
II. CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF REMEDIES EXPERIMENT

A. Summary of BackgroundLaws Relating to ContractRemedies Experiment
Under the common law, the usual contract remedies that can be sought when
a party breaches an agreement to sell or buy real estate are as follows: (i)
"specific performance" (i.e., the right to force the other party to close the deal,
with the buyer paying the purchase price and the seller deeding the property to
the buyer);' (ii) benefit of the bargain damages,4 5 also sometimes referred to as
expectation damages or "loss-of-bargain damages," which calculation is based
upon the difference between the fair market value of the real estate on the date
of the breach and the contract price46 (for example, if the contract price is
$100,000, and the fair market value is $115,000, if the seller breaches the
contract, the buyer can recover $15,000 in expectation damages); (iii) reliance
damages, which are based upon any expenditures made by the non-breaching
party in order to perform under the contract (if the seller breaches the contract,
and the buyer has incurred expenses, such as expenditures from securing
financing paying for a home appraisal or inspection, the buyer can recover these
expenses as their reliance damages);4 7 (iv) "restitution and rescission," which
means termination of the contract and return of any sums the non-breaching party
has paid to the other party (such as the earnest money);48 (v) incidental damages,
which are damages that arise due to breach of the contract that the breaching
party could have reasonably anticipated and which the non-breaching party could
not have reasonably avoided49 (such as the buyer having to pay a fee to the lender
to obtain the same interest rate on the loan if during the closing delay the interest
rate increased); and (v) liquidated damages, which is an agreement in the contract

42. Braunstein did note that while 41% of those surveyed said they hired their own lawyers
to help them purchase the house, a later question revealed that nine of the fifty-four respondents
paid no fee to their lawyer, and two of the fifty-four said they never had met or spoke with their
lawyer. Id. at 471 & n.5.
43. Alan M. Weinberger, Some Further Observations on Using the Pervasive Method of
Teaching Legal Ethics in Property Courses, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1203, 1205 (2007) (stating
"transactional real estate practice generates a greater proportion oflegal malpractice claims than any
other field (twenty-five percent)"). See also infra Part IV.
44. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.5, at 738
(3d ed. 2000).
45. Id. § 10.3, at 724.
46. Id.
47. Id at 727-28.
48. Id. § 10.7, at 748-49.
49. Id. § 10.3, at 727-29.
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of the damages that the breaching party will owe as a specified amount (such as,
for a breach by the buyer, the amount of money serving as the earnest money
deposit [typically an amount between 5-10% of the purchase price]). This
liquidated amount is generally due notwithstanding the actual damages the nonbreaching party might otherwise recover" (i.e., if the actual damages end up
being more or less than the liquidated amount, the liquidated amount, would
control). The amount must be a reasonable estimate of damages at the time the
contract is entered into.5
With the exception of liquidated damages, the other remedies exist even if
a contract is silent on the issue of remedies.5 2 When a contract attempts to limit
any of these otherwise available remedies, this is called an "exculpation clause"
or a "limitation of liability" clause, which exist in the "clearly unfair" and
"vaguely unfair" contract conditions categories described below. 3 As will be
discussed in detail in Part II, most exculpation/limitation of liability clauses are
enforced but may not be enforced by some courts in extreme cases. The list of
remedies described above (except for liquidated damages) would all apply to the
"fair" contract condition. The possibility of recovering attorneys' fees to enforce
the agreement is a special category and is not covered by the common law as a
remedy for breach of contract. 4 To recover attorneys' fees for enforcing the
agreement and to seek remedies after a breach, one needs either to specially
provide for this in the agreement (as done in the fair contract condition but not
in the clearly unfair or vaguely unfair contract conditions), or there must be a
statute on point that covers the situation (for example, a consumer fraud claim).55
There are also limits to the combination of remedies that a non-breaching party
can recover, such as not being able to recover both specific performance or
benefit of the bargain damages and also reliance-type damages.56

50. Id. § 10.4, at 733.
5 1. Id. at 734. To be enforceable, the amount must "be a reasonable estimate," at the time
the parties enter into the contract, of the amount of damages the non-breaching party will sustain.
Id. at 734-35. But some courts will look at the actual damages, and if they are far less than the
liquidated amount, might rule that the liquidate amount is a penalty and not enforceable. Id. at 735.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § § 344-346 (1981).
53. See 8 RiCHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:25 (4th ed. 2012).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345; see Clevert v. Jeff W. Soden, Inc., 400

S.E.2d 181, 183-84 (Va. 1991) (awarding attorney's fees because the contract contained a provision
requiring the defaulting party to pay them).
55. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) ("The rule
here has long been that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract providing therefor.").
56. The participant responses on this issue reflected a lack of knowledge of such limitations.
Details of these results are on file with the second author. We asked participants questions related
to that and since this knowledge is not relevant to how the contract remedies clause should be
drafted, we are not reporting in this Article the results from those questions.
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B. The ConsumerRemedies Experiment
In designing the Consumer Remedies Experiment, we were inspired by a
similar study conducted by Stolle and Slain in 1997." 7 In their study, participants
imagined that they were injured while using exercise equipment at a health club
in one scenario and imagined that their car was scratched in a repair shop in
another.5 8 Participants reviewed the exculpation clauses in the gym's and the
shop's contracts.59 The language, if enforceable, would have severely restricted
the gym's and the shop's liability. 60 Two-thirds of the participants correctly
identified that there was a clause that prevented their potential for recovery in a
lawsuit. 6' In 2011, the authors of this Article conducted an experiment to
investigate the abilities of individuals to understand restrictive remedies clauses
in home purchase contracts and the methods and results of this experiment are
described below.62
1. Methods.a. Participants.-Onehundred seventy-seven undergraduate students
completed the questionnaire for course credit. Participants were randomly
assigned as follows: fifty-two to the fair condition, sixty-five to the clearly unfair
condition, and sixty to the vaguely unfair condition. The sample was 64.9%
female, 62.5% white, 13.6% Hispanic, 5.7% Asian American, 5.7% African
American, and 2.3% Native American. The majority of participants identified
as Democrats (52.3%), followed by Independents (19.3%), Republicans (13.6%),
Libertarians (7.4%), and Green Party (3.4%). Participants rated their family
income levels as high (6.8%), upper-middle (39.7%), middle (42.0%), or low
(8.0%). These participants had little to no personal experience with home
purchase scenarios like the one described in this experiment. They were asked
whether they had ever had an experience similar to this one and to respond on a
7-point scale with "1" representing "not at all similar," "4" representing
"somewhat similar," and "7" representing "very similar." The average response
was 1.37. Participants were also asked how reputable they thought most
professional real estate developers are in general on a 7-point scale with "1"
representing "not at all reputable," "4" representing "somewhat reputable," and
"7" representing "very reputable." The average response was 4.20.
b. Materialsandprocedure.-Participants
entered the laboratory and were
given a randomly assigned questionnaire with either a fair, clearly unfair, or
vaguely unfair remedies clause.

57. Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain,StandardForm Contractsand ContractSchemas:
A PreliminaryInvestigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to
Sue. 15 BEHAV. SCl. & L.83 (1997).
58. Id.
at 87.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 88.
62. Remedies Experiment,supra note 8.The following information, including the Methods,
Results, and subsequent analysis are allattributed to the Remedies Experiment.
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In the "faircondition" questionnaire, the remedies clause read,
In the event of default by Seller or Buyer, the Partiesarefree to pursue
any legal remedies at law or in equity. Theprevailingparty in litigation
shall be entitledto collect reasonableattorney'sfees andcostsfrom the
losing party as orderedby a court of competentjurisdiction.
This clause provides both parties with equal protection. Both parties are free to
pursue all of the legal remedies described above and liabilities were reciprocal.
In the "clearly unfair condition" group, the remedies clause read,
In the event this sale is not closed within sixty (60) daysfrom the date
hereof and Buyer is not then in default, then Seller shall, upon written
requestofBuyer, returnBuyer's earnestmoney andthis Agreement shall
become null and void Seller's liability in the event of Seller's breach
of the contractshall be limitedto the return of Buyer's earnest money.
In the event ofBuyer's default hereunderthen the Seller shall retainthe
earnest money as Seller's liquidateddamages andsole remedy.
This clearly unfair clause is problematic from the perspective of the buyer,
because if the seller defaults, the seller's liability is limited to the return of the
buyer's earnest money. By contrast, if the buyer defaults, the seller would retain
the buyer's earnest money (a significant sum of money at 5% of the purchase
price under the scenario we described in the study). That is, the seller never risks
their own money and the buyer, in essence, has waived four potentially
significant remedies listed above (specific performance, benefit of the
bargain/expectation damages, reliance damages, and consequential damages)
even though those remedies were not specifically noted as being waived in the
clause.
In the "vaguely unfair condition" questionnaire, the remedies clause was
identical to the remedies clause in the clearly unfair condition except that the
words "in the event of Seller's breach of the contract" were dropped from the
second sentence, making that sentence simply state, "Seller's liability shall be
limited to the return of Buyer's earnest money." This change makes it unclear
under what circumstances the seller's liability is limited to return of buyer's
earnest money. It could potentially relate to only a termination of the contract
due to a failure of a condition to closing occurring, such as the buyer obtaining
financing, as contrasted with having the limitation of liability clause also cover
a seller default situation. Because the language is broad, it is likely a court would
interpret it to cover the default situation, and the clause is likely to have the same
effect as the clearly unfair contact condition clause.
Participants were then told to imagine that they had performed all of the
duties required by the contract, including depositing 5% of the purchase price as
earnest money ($10,000) under the contract. They wished to close the deal, but
the seller refused. They suspected that the seller had received a better offer, and
their attorney advised them that the seller would be in breach of the contract if
the seller did not close. In addition, if the deal did not close, they would still owe
their attorney $300 in fees for the work performed on the deal. They had already
paid $400 for an inspection of the home, $450 for the appraisal report on the
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home, and for a credit check to get a loan to purchase this home. They were told
to imagine that, based upon an appraisal of the home, the purchase price under
the contract was $15,000 lower than the property, appraised price and that if they
desired to buy a comparable home the purchase price would likely be $15,000
higher. In addition, interest rates had risen since they first locked in the interest
rate. The mortgage broker told them that obtaining the same loan with the same
interest rate on another house would cost an additional $1000.
Participants were then asked to answer a series of questions regarding the
actions they would take in the scenario, and their interpretations of the rights they
would have under the contract. These questions along with participants'
responses in each of the three conditions are described in the following results
section.
2. Results.a. Participantswere asked to briefly explain what they would do in similar
circumstances.-We were curious to see if those in the fair condition group
stated they would seek more remedies than those in the unfair conditions group
in light of the different remedies language in the contracts. Responses were
categorized as pursuing legal remedies, such as suing or speaking to an attorney,
or not pursuing remedies beyond the return of the earnest money. When
responses were ambiguous as to which category was most appropriate, responses
to subsequent questions were used to determine the appropriate category. When
it was not possible to categorize responses, they were dropped from analysis. Of
the participants who answered the question and had clear responses, more
participants indicated that they were inclined to pursue remedies in the fair
condition group (43/48 or 89.6%) than in the clearly unfair condition group
(38/55 or 69.1%) or in the vaguely unfair condition group (30/47 or 63.8%).
These differences were statistically significant, Z (2, N = 150) = 9.2 7,p <.01.63
b. Participantswere asked how similarthey thought the remedies clause in
the contract was to those used by most professional real estate developers.They answered on a 7-point scale, with "1" representing "not at all similar," "4"
representing "somewhat similar," and "7" representing "very similar." This
question was intended to get a sense of whether the participants assumed the
remedies clause was typical or not. If there was no statistical difference in the
results among the three conditions, it could indicate that there was no knowledge
of what is customary. Based on the results from the Condo Contracts Study,' the
correct answer under thefair conditionclause would be a "1," the correct answer
under the vaguely unfair condition would be a "6"and a "7" under the clearly
unfair condition.
By contrast, participants in the fair condition group gave the fair clause an
average of 4.9 on this scale, participants in the clearly unfair condition group
gave it a 4.7, and participants in the vaguely unfair conditiongroup gave it a 4.8.
These responses were not different by a statistically significant amount between

63. This statistic reports the results of a chi-square analysis used to investigate categorical
data P-values less than .05 are considered statistically significant by convention.
64. Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
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conditions, F(2, 174) = 0.40, p > .05.65 The finding that ratings differed so
drastically from the results from the Condo Contracts Study 66 suggests that the
participants did not know what type of remedies clauses are customary. This
result underscores the need for consumers to have the necessary contractual
scripts and schemas to protect themselves. Our participants lacked these scripts
and schemas.
c. Participantsratedhow difficult they found it to understandthe language
of the remedies clause in the contract.-Participantsagain based their answers
on a 7-point scale, with "1" representing "not at all difficult," "4" representing
"somewhat difficult," and "7" representing "very difficult." Prior to running the
experiment, we thought that both the fair and clearly unfair remedies clauses
were easy to understand, and the vaguely unfair clause was more difficult
because it was not clear what situations the limitation-of-remedies related to.
While the participants would not have known all of the precise remedies
available in the absence of an exculpation/limitation of liability clause, we
thought they would at least recognize that they would be limited to a refund of
their own money.
Contrary to this original prediction, all participants rated their clause as
"somewhat difficult." Differences were not statistically significant, F(2,174) =
0.92, p > .05.67 Participants in the clearly unfair condition group rated this
clause a 4.6 in difficulty, participants in the fair condition group rated it a 4.3,
and participants in the vaguely unfair condition group rated it a 4.2; but this
difference was not statistically significant despite the major differences in these
remedies clauses.
Based on other results from the Consumer Remedies Experiment, it appears
that the clearly wordedfair remedies clause was "somewhat difficult" for them
to understand because they did not precisely know what "legal remedies" were
available to them "at law or in equity," legal terminology that any lawyer or
judge who has taken a contracts course in law school should readily understand
but apparently not understandable to laypersons. Similarly, the clearly worded
unfair remedy clause was also "somewhat difficult" for them to understand,
perhaps because many were not precisely sure what words like "sole remedy"
meant. Their admitted difficulties in understanding the clauses most likely
accounts for their difficulties identifying the portions of the remedies clause that
would prevent them from recovering damages, an issue discussed below.
d Participantswere asked how likely they would be to demand that the
Sellerpayfor their losses and to ratehow successful they thought they would be
if they demandedthat the Sellerpay for their losses.-Participants used on the
same 7-point likelihood scale described above. Prior to running the study, we
thought that participants who were given the fair remedies clause would have
been most likely to make this demand, followed by the vaguely unfairand clearly

65. This statistic reports the results of an analysis of variance used to investigate quantitative
values such as ratings. P-values less than .05 are considered statistically significant by convention.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 65.
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unfair clauses. After all, the fair remedies clause would have given the
participants who were given that clause grounds for making this demand.
Contrary to this original prediction, the type of remedies clause did not have
a substantial effect on participants' ratings of how likely they would be to make
this demand. Participants given the fair clause rated their likelihood of making
this demand a 5.8, participants given the clearly unfair clause rated their
likelihood a 5.5, and participants given the vaguely unfair clause rated their
likelihood a 5.6. These ratings were quite high, between "somewhat likely" and
"very likely," but did not statistically differ across conditions, F(2,1 72) = 0.42,
MSE = 2.88, p > .05.68

The finding that participants' responses did not differ across the different
remedies clauses reflects a lack of understanding of the impact of the contract
remedies language on their rights to recover their losses (Why make a demand
for losses if you are unlikely to be able to recover on this demand?). It may also
reflect a failure to understand the types of losses they could be
recovering-depending on the language in the contract-with some viewing the
loss of their earnest money paid as their only loss (perhaps due to the language
in all three contracts that refer to this possible loss), versus the range of other
losses they would be compensated for under the law.
Participants were optimistic on the question of how successful they thought
they would be in making demands. If knowledgeable of the impact of the
remedies clause language, participants who were given the fair remedies clause
would rate a likely chance of success, and participants who were given the
vaguely unfair and clearly unfair clauses would rate a less likely chance of
success. However, participants in the fair condition group were unduly
pessimistic, and participants in the clearly unfair and vaguely unfairconditions
groups were unduly optimistic about their chances given how those remedies
clauses read. Responses were all in the "somewhat successful" range and did not
differ across the different remedies clauses by a statistically significant amount,
F(2,1 72) = 1.5 7, MSE = 2.66,p > .05.69 Participants given thefair clause rated
their likelihood of success as 4.5; whereas, participants given the clearly unfair
clause rated their likelihood a 3.9, and participants given the vaguely unfair
clause rated their likelihood a 4.2. These are all small differences without
statistical or practical significance. These results suggest that participants either
did not understand the legal consequences or implications of the remedies clauses
they were given or possibly confined their understanding of "losses" in the two
unfair conditions clauses to their earnest money.
e. Similarto the study performed by Stolle andSlain (1997),7 participants
were asked whether the remedies clause in the contractmightprevent them from
recoveringon their demand-We asked this because participant answers to the
question of their likelihood of success may have been influenced by their beliefs
regarding the legal system (i.e., whether the legal system is fair or rigged against

68. See supra note 65.
69. See supra note 65.
70. Stolle & Slain, supra note 57.
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them), rather than making an appraisal based upon the actual reading of the
remedies clauses. To address this question and focus more specifically on the
reading of the remedies clause, participants were asked, as a simple "yes" or "no"5
question, whether they thought that the remedies clause in the contract, as
opposed to other factors, might prevent them from recovering on their demand.
The normative answer was "no" in the fair condition group and "yes" in the
clearly unfair and vaguely unfair conditions groups. Consistent with the
normative answer, approximately two thirds of participants (68.0%) in the fair
condition group correctly answered "no." This left, however, approximately onethird of the participants given thefair clause who failed to comprehend how fair
the fair remedies clause was. Although 65.6% of participants who were given the
clearly unfairclause correctly answered "yes," 34.4% failed to comprehend how
the wording of that clause would prevent them from recovering on their demand.
The percentages in the Remedies Experiment who stated "yes" to understanding
there is a limitation on what remedies they can recover is similar to the
percentage in Stolle and Slain's experiment of those who identified the
clause-after reading the entire contract-that limited their ability to recover in
a lawsuit.7' We did not provide an entire contract in the Remedies Experiment
but only provided them with the limitation of remedies clause.
When we asked the participants to circle the portion of the clause that limited
their remedies (discussed in the next section), participants were much less likely
to correctly do so than the two-thirds of participants who correctly identified that
the clause limited their remedies. This finding suggests that participants may
have been guessing when they identified that the clause limited their liability as
they could not correctly explain their response. Also troubling, was the finding
that only 44.1% of participants who were given the vaguely unfair remedies
clause correctly answered "yes." Thus, more than half of the participants
(55.9%) failed to comprehend how the wording of that clause would prevent
them from recovering on their demand. The differences between these groups
were statistically significant, 1(2,173) = 13.43, p < .0172 with the participants
in the vaguely unfair condition group the most likely to fail to comprehend how
the remedies clause would affect their likelihood of succeeding in recovering
their losses. This is consistent with one of our hypotheses that consumers under
the vaguely unfair clause are less likely to realize how their remedies have been
reduced than those in the clearly unfair clause. It should be noted, however, that
the other two conditions also reflected a significant amount of inaccurate
understandings on this issue.
f Participantswere asked to circle the portions of the remedies clause that
might prevent them from recovering.-Ofthose given the fair clause, where
nothing prevented them from recovering, seventeen participants out of fifty-two
(32.7%) incorrectly circled something. In the clearly unfair clause, the words
"limited to" in the sentence "Seller's liability in the event of Seller's breach of
the contract shall be limited to the return of Buyer's earnest money" was the key

71. Id.
72. See supra note 63.
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portion that prevented recovery. Likewise, in the vaguely unfair clause, the
words "limited to" in the sentence "Seller's liability shall be limited to the return
of Buyer's earnest money" was the key portion that prevented recovery. Only a
minority (seventeen out of sixty-five; 26.2% of participants given the clearly
unfairclause) correctly circled those words in that sentence. Even fewer (six out
of fifty-seven; 10.5%) correctly circled those words when given the vaguely
unfair clause. This difference between the clearly unfair and vaguely
unfair
73
2
clauses was statistically significant, X (1,N = 122) = 8.03, p < .01.
g. Participantswere asked how likely they would be to seek advicefrom an
attorney.-Participants based their answers on the 7-point likelihood scale
described above. Ratings were high for all three conditions but were not lower
in the fair condition than in the clearly unfair and vaguely unfair conditions,
F(2,174) = 0.17, MSE = 1.38, p > .05.
Participants rated themselves a
6.3 (very likely) on this scale in thefair conditiongroup, 6.3 in the clearly unfair
condition group, and 6.2 in the vaguely unfair condition group. This finding
suggests that it is not clear to the participants what rights they have under the
remedies clauses and would benefit from advice of an attorney on this.
h. Participantswere asked, assuming their attorney hadadvised them that
a lawsuit was possible,to rate on the likelihoodscale describedabove how likely
they would be in successfully recovering what they desired in a lawsuit.-This
question is similar to the earlier question of the likelihood of recovering losses
upon demand but is different in two ways. This question, by referring to a
lawsuit, clarifies that a judge is making the decision now, versus "demands"
where the seller may be deciding. Second, by referring to recovering what they
"desire," this question expands on the recovery notion by asking participants to
consider what they desire (for example getting the property) versus just
recovering their losses (such as earnest money and out of pocket expenses). The
normative answer should have been "7" (very likely) for participants who were
given the fair clause, "1" (not at all likely) for participants who were given the
clearly unfair clause, and "1.5" for participants who were given the vaguely
unfair clause, in light of the summary of background laws on contract remedies
previously provided. Contrary to these normative answers, responses were all
slightly above "somewhat likely," and while they differed by an amount that is
considered marginally significant, F(2,174) = 2.94, MSE = 1.82, p =. 06, they
did not differ by an amount that would have practical consequences. The average
of the responses of the participants given the fair clause were 5.2, the average of
the responses of the participants given the clearly unfairclause was 4.8, and the
average of the responses of the participants given the vaguely unfair clause was
4.5. Again, since the responses to this question on the likelihood of being
successful in a lawsuit across conditions did not statistically differ, this is
evidence that consumers did not understand the impact of the contract language
on what they can recover for a breach of contract.

73. See supra note 63.
74. See supra note 65.
75. See supra note 65.
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i. Participantswere asked how successful they thought they would be in a
lawsuit to recoverfive specific losses.-These losses included: (1) attorneys' fees
for negotiating the contract and handling the matter before the default (an
example ofreliance damages); (2) attorneys' fees for handling the litigation (only
recoverable if the contract or applicable statute provides for attorneys' fees); (3)
the $400 paid for the inspection and $450 for the appraisal report and credit
check to obtain the loan (examples of reliance damages); (4) the $10,000 for the
difference between the fair market value of the home and the purchase price (the
expectation/benefit of bargain damages); and (5) the $1000 to obtain a new loan
at the same rate (although rates have risen) to close on the purchase of a home
(an example of consequential damages). In addition to this general question
regarding how successful they thought they would be on each of these items,
participants were asked more specifically, as "yes" or "no" questions, whether
the remedies clause or any laws on remedies might prevent them from
recovering. In general, participants who were given the fair remedies clause
were unduly pessimistic, and participants who were given the clearly unfairand
vaguely unfair remedies clauses were unduly optimistic. Each result reflects a
major lack of understanding of the impact of the contract language on what they
could recover.
(1) Recovery ofattorneys'fees for negotiatingthe contractand handlingthe
matter before default:
On the question asking the likelihood of recovering attorneys' fees for
negotiating the contract and handling the matter before the default, the normative
answer should have been a "7" among participants who were given the fair
remedies clause, a "1.5" among those given the clearly unfair remedies clause,
and a "2" among those given the vaguely unfair remedies clause, based on the
laws relating to contract remedies summarized earlier.76 Consistent with these
normative answers, the remedies clause affected participants' judgments by a
statistically significant amount, F(2,174) = 3.95, MSE = 3.71, p <. 05,77 although
the majority of responses were in the "somewhat likely" range. Responses of
participants who were given the fair clause (mean = 4.8, slightly above
"somewhat likely") differed from the responses of participants who were given
the clearly unfair clause (mean = 3.7, slightly below "somewhat likely"), t(I 15)
= 3.08, p <.01, and the responses of participants who were given the vaguely
unfair clause (mean = 3.1, slightly below "somewhat likely"), t(1 10) = 4.97,p
<.01.78 The responses of participants who were given the clearly unfair and the
vaguely unfair clauses did not differ from each other once error control is taken

76. The attorneys' fees to handle the deal should be treated like other reliance type damages.
However, we speculate some courts might confuse this with the attorneys' fees relating to enforcing
the agreement (i.e., litigation costs) and mistakenly not permit a recovery of the pre-litigation
attorneys' fees.
77. See supra note 65.
78. This statistic reports the results of a t-test used to investigate whether the quantitative
values from one group differ from the quantitative values from a second group (only works when
there are two groups). P-values less than .05 are considered statistically significant by convention.
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into consideration, t(] 23) = 1.90, p > .017.79
To try to understand the factors that could have affected participants'
judgments on the likelihood of recovering attorneys' fees for negotiating the
contract and handling the matter before the default, participants were also asked
to indicate as simple "yes" or "no" answers whether there were any portions of
the remedies clause or, in a separate question, any laws of remedies that could
prevent them from recovering. The normative answer should have been "no"
among participants who were given the fair remedies clause and "yes" among
participants who were given the clearly unfair and vaguely unfair remedies
clauses because, under the fair condition, the buyer has not waived her right to
recover reliance type damages. Consistent with these normative answers, 73.1%
of the participants who were given the fair remedies clause correctly identified
that the remedies clause would not prevent them from recovering, leaving 26.9%
of the participants who incorrectly believed there were portions that could
prevent them from recovering. More troubling, however, is the finding that
55.4% of participants who were given the clearly unfair remedies clause and
51.7% of participants who were given the vaguely unfair remedies clause (i.e.,
more than half) incorrectly believed that no portion of their remediesclause
would prevent them from recovering attorneys' fees incurred before the default,
even though the clauses, especially the clearly unfair one, states the buyer's sole
remedy in the event of the seller's breach is return of the buyer's earnest money.
The differences between groups were marginally significant, 1(2,N = 177) =
5.95, p =. 05,80 but the number of participants who failed to understand how their
remedies clause would prevent them from recovering was troubling.
(2) Recovery of attorneys 'feesfor handling the litigation (only recoverable
if the contractprovides for this or a statute does):
On the question of recovering attorneys' fees for handling the litigation, the
normative answer is "7" ("very likely") under the fair condition and "1" ("not at
all likely") in the clearly unfair and vaguely unfair conditions. This is because
laws of remedies prevent plaintiffs from recovering attorneys' fees for handling
litigation unless the contract states otherwise,8" and the fair condition contract
clause provides for recovery of these fees to the prevailing party. Our
participants were not lawyers, so they were not likely aware of this requirement
for recovering attorneys' fees. Perhaps because the fair condition explicitly
spells out recovery of attorneys' fees in this situation, which the other two
conditions did not, responses differed according to the remedies clause that
participants were given by a statistically significant amount, F(2,174) = 14.15,
MSE = 3 .12 , p <. 01.82 Responses of participants who were given thefair clause
(mean = 4.8, slightly above "somewhat likely") differed from the responses of

79. See supra note 78.
80. See supra note 63.
81. See, e.g., Timberland Forest Prods., Inc. v. Franks, No. SD 31898, 2013 WL 941828, at
*5 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 12,2013); Shelton v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., 550 F. Supp. 2d 74, 82 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Pekins Ins. Co., 899 N.E.2d 251, 256 (I11. 2008).
82. See supra note 65.
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participants who were given the clearly unfairclause (mean = 3.2, slightly below
"somewhat likely"), t(l 15) = 5.3 7, p <. 01, and the responses of participants who
were given the vaguely unfair clause (mean = 3.5, slightly below "somewhat
likely"), t(l 1O) = 3.93, p < .01. The responses of participants who were given
the clearly unfair and the vaguely unfair clauses did not differ from each other,
t(123) = 0.92, p > 05.83 Despite these statistically significant differences, the
participants who received the clearly and vaguely unfair clauses were unduly
optimistic, and the participants who received the fair clause were unduly
pessimistic once we consider the normative answers. Participants who were
given thefair remedies clause were not statistically less likely (38.5%) to believe
there were portions of the remedies clause that would prevent them from
recovering attorneys' fees for handling the litigation than participants who were
given the clearly unfairremedies clause (49.2%) or participants who were given
the vaguely unfair remedies clause, 48.3%, J(2,177) = 1.59, p > .05. Over
70.8% who were given the clearly unfairclause, and 76.3% who were given the
vaguely unfair clause incorrectly believed there were no laws of remedies that
would prevent them from recovering on this issue, while 23.1% of participants
who were given thefair clause incorrectly believed there were laws of remedies
that would prevent them from recovering on this issue (participants' responses
did not differ accordingto the remedies clause they received, X'(2,176) = 0. 73,
p >. 05).84 These results reflect a material misunderstanding of the law relating
to recovery of attorney's fees in an action to enforce the contract.
(3) Recovery of the $400 paidfor the inspection and $450for the appraisal
report andcredit check to obtain the loan (examples of reliance damages):
On the question of recovering the $400 paid for the inspection and the $450
for the appraisal report and credit check to obtain the loan, the normative answer
should have been a "7" among participants who were given the fair remedies
clause, a "1.5" among those given the clearly unfairremedies clause, and a "2"
among those given the vaguely unfair remedies clause for the reasons previously
explained in the summary of the law of contract remedies. Responses differed
according to the remedies clauses that participants were given by amounts that
are considered marginally significant, F(2,174) = 2.64, MSE = 3.56, p =.07.85
Participants who were given the fair remedies clause rated their likelihood of
recovering the monies higher than participants who were given the clearly unfair
remedies clause (mean = 4.7 for the fair clause versus mean = 3.9 for the clearly
unfair clause) and participants who were given the vaguely unfair remedies
clause (mean = 4.0); however, the amounts that failed to reach statistical
significance once error control was taken into consideration were t(115) = 2.24,
p > .017 for the difference between the fair and clearly unfair conditions and
t(1 10) = 1.81, p > .017 for the difference between the fair and the vaguely unfair
conditions. The difference between the clearly unfair and the vaguely unfair

83. See supra note 78.
84. See supra note 63.
85. See supra note 65.
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clauses also failed to reach statistical significance, t(123) = 0.23, p > .05.86

These differences suggest that while some participants understood that the unfair
remedies clauses would prevent them from recovering on this issue, many did
not.
Further evidence that many participants did not understand how the unfair
remedies clauses would prevent them from recovering the $400 paid for the
inspection and the $450 for the appraisal report and credit check comes from
their answers to the "yes" or "no" question of whether there were any portions
of the remedies clause that would prevent this recovery. The differences in
responses between participants given the different remedies clauses did not reach
statistical significance, 2 (2,177) = 1.16,p >. 05.87 Of the participants given the
fair remedies clause, 36.5% incorrectly thought that the remedies clause would
prevent them from recovering these expenses, and 53.8% of the participants in
the clearly unfair and 60% of the participants in the vaguely unfair remedies
clause mistakenly thought that their remedies clauses would not prevent them
from recovering these expenses. This lack of understanding of the impact of the
exculpation/limitation of liability clause language is much higher than predicted
and contrary to assumptions made by courts on consumer understanding of such
clauses."8
(4) Recovery of the $10, 000for the difference between the fairmarket value
ofthe home andthepurchaseprice(the expectation/benefitof bargaindamages):
On the question of whether participants believed that they could recover the
$10,000 for the difference between the fair market value of the home and the
purchase price, the normative answer should have been a "7" among participants
who were given thefairremedies clause (since it reserved all rights and remedies
under the law which would include this type of expectation damages), a "1"
among those given the clearly unfair remedies clause (since this clause clearly
limited the buyer's remedy to return of the earnest money), and a "1.5" among
those given the vaguely unfair remedies clause (since this clause was not as
clearly limiting of the buyer's remedy for a seller breach to return of the earnest
money). Contrary to these normative answers, responses did not differ according
to the remedies clause that participants were given, F(2,174) = 1.64, MSE = 3.35,
p > .05.89 That is, the average rating of 3.37 for the fair clause, 3.32 for the
clearly unfair clause, and 2.82 for the vaguely unfair clause were not different by
statistically significant amounts. The average ratings on this question were also
lower than the average ratings on the question regarding recovering the $400 paid
for the inspection and the $450 for the appraisal report and credit check,
suggesting that participants were generally skeptical that they could recover such
a large amount or that $10,000 even represented a true loss. Indeed, some of the
qualitative responses reflected a sense that this type of recovery was

86. See supranote 78.
87. See supranote 63.
88. Goodwin v. Hole No. 4, LLC, No. 2:06-cv-00679, 2007 WL 2221066, at *8-9 (D. Utah
July 31, 2007).

89. See supranote 65.
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inappropriate. Some of the responses included: "not really money I'm out, never
owned the house in full," "seems not solid, by that I mean that it's hard to award
buyer with theorized money," and "the seller does not have to reimburse the
buyer for offering a good deal." These responses reflect a lack of understanding
of benefit of the bargain/expectation type damages, which is a less obvious "loss"
than out-of-pocket expenses related to performing under the contract. This result
underscores the importance of a home-buyer being represented by an attorney at
the contract formation stage, for attorney approval of the contract condition so
that they may negotiate for a "fair" remedies clause, and an attorney to advise the
buyer of the recoveries she may be entitled to after a breach. In addition,
participants also did not understand how the unfair remedies clauses would
prevent them from recovering the $10,000 for the difference between the fair
market value of the home and the purchase price as evidenced by their answers
to the "yes" or "no" question of whether the remedies clause would prevent them
from recovering on this issue. Although 50% of participants given the fair
remedies clause incorrectly thought their remedies clause would prevent them
from recovering on this issue, over 60% given the clearly unfairclause and 55%
given the vaguely unfair clause thought the clause prevented recovery. These
between-group differences were not statistically significant, X2(2,177) = 1.17,p
> .05.90

(5) Recovery of the $1,000 to obtain a new loan at the same rate (although
rates have risen) to close on the purchase of a home (an example of
consequentialdamages):
On the question of whether participants believed they could recover the
$1000 to obtain a new loan at the same rate (although rates had risen), the
normative answer should have been a "7" among participants who were given the
fairremedies clause (because the contract clause reserved all rights and remedies
which would include consequential damages), 9 a "1" among those given the
clearlyunfairremedies clause (because this clause clearly limited liability for the
seller's breach to return of the earnest money), and a "1.5" among those given the
vaguely unfair remedies clause (because this clause less clearly limited the
liability to return of the earnest money in the event of the seller's breach).
However, the 3.62 rating by participants who were given the fair clause was not
statistically significantly higher than the 3.12 rating by participants who were
given the clearly unfair clause or the 3.08 rating by participants who were given
the vaguely unfair clause by a statistically significant amount, F(2,1 74) = 1.44,
MSE = 3.34, p > .05.92 In addition, answers to the "yes" or "no" question of
whether the remedies clause would prevent them from recovering on this issue

90. See supra note 63.
91. This type of loss naturally arises from the breach due to the resulting delay in closing on
the loan for another property as a result. It would be awarded as consequential damages if a court
determines the breaching party should have reasonably anticipated this type of loss under the
circumstances (such as the presence of a financing contingency in the contract) and provided the
non-breaching party shows she had taken reasonable steps to avoid this loss.
92. See supra note 65.
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did not differ depending upon the remedies clause, 2(2,177) = 0.58, p > 05.9'
The 51.9% of participants who thought that the fair clause might prevent this did
not statistically differ from the 58.5% who thought that the clearly unfairclause
might prevent it or the 53.3% who thought that the vaguely unfair clause might
prevent it. Similar to the results on recovery of benefit of bargain/expectation
damages, the percentage of participants who thought they could recover this
consequential damage, even in the fair condition, is much lower than for the outof-pocket type reliance damages, reflecting a lack of consumer awareness of the
appropriateness of recovering consequential damages as a loss.
j. Participantswere also asked abouttheir likelihoodofsuccess in a lawsuit
to force the Seller to sell the home to them at the contracted-forpurchaseprice
(the remedy of "specificperformance'9.-Participants answered this question on
a 7-point scale with "1" representing "not at all likely," "4" representing
"somewhat likely," and "7" representing "very likely." Normative answers were
"7" given the fair clause (since this clause reserved all rights and remedies under
the law which would include the right to specific performance), "1.5" given the
clearly unfair clause (a very low likelihood because of the clear language that
says return of the earnest money is the Seller's sole liability in the event of
Seller's breach, but as discussed in Part II, there is the possibility of a court
refusing to enforce this clause if there is a showing that the seller engaged in a
strategic default),94 and "2" given the vaguely unfairclause (since this clause also
limited liability of the seller to return of the earnest money but was not as clear
this would include the circumstance of a seller breach of contract). Contrary to
these normative answers, the 4.27 average rating among participants who were
given the fair clause was not higher than the 4.5 rating among those given the
clearly unfair clause or the 4.3 rating among those given the vaguely unfair
clause, F(2,173) = 0.30, MSE = 3.21, p >.05. These results demonstrate not
only that the participants who were given unfair clauses were overly optimistic,
but also, it appears, these participants had no idea how the wording of the clause
would undermine their attempt to force the seller to sell the home to them. In the
other direction, but equally wrong, the participants in the fair condition were
unduly pessimistic on their chances of obtaining specific performance and
appeared to fail to understand that the words "free to pursue any legal remedies
at law or in equity" means an action for specific performance. There could,
however, have been factors other than the remedies clause that could have
affected participants' responses.
To focus participants' attention on the remedies clause in particular,
participants were asked a "yes" or "no" question whether they thought any
portions of the remedies clause might prevent them from forcing the Seller to sell

93. See supra note 63.
94. It is difficult to quantify the likelihood of enforcement in the clearly and vaguely unfair
clauses since there is a difference of opinion among thejurisdictions. Courts in Florida are unlikely
to enforce the clauses, while courts in other jurisdictions are more likely to enforce it, unless, in
some jurisdictions, there is a showing of "bad faith" as defined by that court. See infra Part III.
95. See supra note 65.
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the home to them at the contracted purchase price. The normative responses
were "no" given the fair clause and "yes" given the clearly unfair and vaguely
unfair clauses; however, 26.9% of participants given the fair clause incorrectly
said "yes," while only 35.9% correctly said "yes" given the clearly unfairclause
and 31.7% correctly said "yes" given the vaguely unfair clause. The responses
did not even differ between the groups by a statistically significant amount,
X2(2,177) = 2.20, p >.05.96 The fact that 64.1% in the clearly unfair condition
and 68.3% in the vaguely unfair condition failed to realize the
exculpation/limitation-of-remedies clause would prevent them from obtaining the
important remedy of specific performance underscores the lack of consumer
understanding of such exculpation/limitation-of-remedies clauses, even when
clearly focusing on the words in answering questions.
k. Participantswere asked to circle the portions of the remedies clause that
might prevent them from forcingthe Seller in a lawsuit to sell the home to them
at the contracted-forpurchase price.--Of those given the fair clause where
nothing prevented them from doing so, (twenty participants out of fifty-two;
38.5%), incorrectly circled something. In the clearly unfair clause, the words
"limited to" in the sentence "Seller's liability in the event of Seller's breach of
the contract shall be limited to the return of Buyer's earnest money" was the key
portion. Likewise, in the vaguely unfair clause, the words "limited to" in the
sentence "Seller's shall be limited to the return of Buyer's earnest money" was
the key portion. Only a minority of those given the clearly unfairclause (thirteen
participants out of sixty-five; 20.0%) correctly circled those words in the
sentence. Even fewer (five participants out of fifty-seven; 8.8%), however,
correctly circled those words given the vaguely unfair clause. This difference
between the clearly unfair and vaguely unfair clauses was not statistically
significant but would be considered marginal, X(1,I = 122) = 3.04, p =. 08."
l.Participantswere asked how likely it was that a court of law would uphold
the remedies clause in the contract they signed.-Participants based their
answers on the 7-point scale, with 1 representing "not at all likely," "4"
representing "somewhat likely," and '7' representing "very likely." The
normative answers were "7" given the fair clause (because this clause is mutual
and reserves all rights under the law), "5.0" given the clearly unfair clause
(which, although very unfair, is still somewhat likely to be enforced since, as
discussed in Part III, based on a review of reported decisions, it appears that most
courts have enforced this type of exculpation/limitation of liability clause,
although Florida courts have found such clauses to create illusory agreements
and have consequently not enforced this type of clause), and 4.5 given the
vaguely unfair clause (because this clause is not as clear that it covers seller's
breach, a court might rule it does not limit remedies in such a circumstance). The
alternative remedies clauses affected responses, F(2,174) = 3.03, MSE = 2.02,
p =.05. Average likelihood ratings given the clearlyunfair clause (mean = 5.1)

96. See supra note 63.
97. See supra note 63.
98. See supra note 65.
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were lower than the ratings given the fair clause (mean = 5.8) by a statistically
significant amount, t(115) = 2.57, p < .05, but not lower by a statistically
significant amount than ratings given the vaguely unfair clause (mean = 5.5),
t(123) = 1.14, p > .05. 9 These responses were about correct for the unfair
clauses because the case law on this issue is mixed, but too low for the fair
clause. Before being encouraged by the participants' "correct" rating in the
unfair and clearly unfair conditions, it should be noted that based on their
answers to prior questions, they did not understand the impact of these clauses
on what they could or could not recover.
m. Participantswere asked how fair they thought the remedies clause was
to the buyer.-Answers were based on a 7-point scale with "1" representing "not
at all fair," "4" representing "somewhat fair," and "7" representing "very fair."
The type of clause affected the fairness ratings, F(2,174) = 3.98, MSE = 1.04, p
<.05.00 Average fairness ratings were higher (mean = 4.44) by a statistically
significant amount given the fair clause, but the ratings given the clearly unfair
clause (mean = 3.98) did not differ by a statistically significant amount from the
ratings given the vaguely unfair clause (mean = 3.95). Given the dramatic
difference in fairness of the fair condition clause (normative answer was 7) as
contrasted with the clearly unfairand vaguely unfairclauses (normative answer
was 1), the fact that the averages hovered in the middle range is further evidence
that participants did not understand or appreciate the impact of the language used
in the contracts on what rights they would otherwise have had. While some of
the participants were able to judge the fairness of the clauses, many could not.
11.

A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF "RETURN OF
EARNEST MONEY AS BUYER'S SOLE REMEDY" CLAUSES

INHOME PURCHASE CONTRACTS
Based on a review ofreported appellate court decisions, courts have enforced
contracts clauses that provide that the buyer's sole remedy for the seller's default
is return of the buyer's earnest money when this limitation-of-remedy is clearly
provided for in the contract, l° with the notable exception of courts in Florida.'02

99. See supra note 78.
100. See supranote 65.
101. See Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 102-10 (3d Cir. 1990) (ruling that, under
Pennsylvania law, the contract clause limiting the buyer's remedy to return of his earnest money
plus interest, which the contract clearly stated was the sole remedy in the event of seller default, is
enforceable, and, thus, the seller was not obligated to complete construction within two years of the
contract date, causing the contract to be subject to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act);
Goodwin v. Hole No. 4, LLC, No. 2:06-cv-00679, 2007 WL 2221066, at *2, *6, *8-9 (D. Utah July
311, 2007); Hunter v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 927 So. 2d 810, 814-15 (Ala. 2005) (enforcing
limitation ofbuyer's remedy for seller's breach to return of earnest money; however, buyer did not
raise-and court did not address-issue ofunconscionability or illusory promise-rather it focused
on which of two contracts controlled); O'Shield v. Lakeside Bank, 781 N.E.2d 1114, 1116, 1119
(Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (enforcing limitation ofbuyer's remedyupon seller's breach to return ofbuyer's
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In some of these cases, the buyer failed to timely raise-or raise at all-the
argument that the clause might be unconscionable, unreasonable or create an
illusory agreement, and, consequently, the court did not address these issues
when enforcing the limitation-of-remedy clause. °3 But courts in Utah and
Washington"°4 did address arguments raised by buyers that such clauses were
unconscionable, against public policy, unfair or unreasonable, and concluded in
these cases that the clauses were enforceable, even awarding attorneys' fees to
the defaulting seller when the buyer sought to obtain additional remedies." 5 In
addition, some courts that would generally enforce this type of limitation-ofremedy clause have articulated a narrow exception to its enforcement if the
seller's default was in "bad faith" or if the seller had engaged in fraud or
deceptive acts."0 6 Some courts have defined this "bad faith" exception to be the

earnest money; however, buyer's only challenge was that it was a liquidated damages clause and,
thus, should allow specific performance in the alternative-an argument the court rejected; court
did not address any other challenges to its enforcement); Claiborne v. Wilson, 572 So. 2d 1197,
1198, 1200-01 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing limitation of remedy clause for seller's breach to
return of buyer's earnest money; buyer claimed she was coerced into agreement to extend the
closing date but did not raise other claims to challenge the limitation of remedy clause, and the
court did not address other claims); Lespinasse v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
795 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 22, 2003) (contract contained limitation of remedy for seller breach to
return of the earnest money and court enforced this when the seller breached by selling the real
property to a third party for more than the contract price with the buyer; court stated it would
enforce the limitation-of-remedy clause absent a waiver); Simpson Dev. Corp. v. Herrmann, 583
A.2d 90, 92-93 (Vt. 1990) (enforcing the limitation of remedy clause, noting that the buyer failed
to raise proper objections to it in a timely fashion and looking to the plain meaning of the
provision); Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, L.L.C., 210 P.3d 318,322-24 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)
(finding the provision limiting the remedies was not unconscionable).
102. See, e.g., Sperling v. Davie, 41 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1949); Developers of Solamar, LLC v.
Weinhauer, 18 So. 3d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Idevco, Inc. v. Hobaugh, 571 So. 2d488 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Terraces of Boca Assocs. v. Gladstein, 543 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989); Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Ocean Dunes
of Hutchinson Island Dev. Corp. v. Colangelo, 463 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 413 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
103. See Markowitz, 906 F.2d at 104-06; Hunter,929 So. 2d at 810; O'Shield,781 N.E.2d at
1119; Claiborne,572 So. 2d at 1201;Lespinasse,Index No. 216T5N at *4; Herrmann,583 A.2d
at 92-93.
104. See Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *8-9; Torgerson, 210 P.3d at 322-24.
105. See Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *8-9; Torgerson, 210 P.3d at 325-26,
106. See Hassanally v. Manning Ridell, L.L.C., Nos. B171993, B173319, 2006 WL 410700,
at *4-6, *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006) (stating in dicta that limitation of liability clauses are
long recognized in California and enforceable unless unconscionable or against public policy; court
stated the clause was enforceable, but because of fraud on the part of the seller, the court permitted
the buyer to recover tort damages notwithstanding the contract language); Tanglewood Land Co.
v. Byrd, 261 S.E.2d 655, 656-57, 660-61 (N.C. 1980) (in responding to the buyer's claim that the
limitation-of-remedy clause in the contract made it illusory and unenforceable, the court stated that
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situation where the defaulting party has represented she has title to the property
to be sold when she knows she does not, or when she has taken steps to impede
her title after the purchase contract has been signed." 7 For example, the court in
Kooloian v. Suburban Land Co., °8 ruled that it would not enforce a contract
provision that limited the buyer's remedy to the return of his earnest money for
the seller's inability to convey good title because the seller had contracted to sell
certain real estate to a purchaser when the seller had already sold the real estate
to someone else. 9 The court therefore affirmed the trial court's awarding
damages to the buyer for loss of bargain in that case."0 Courts in a long line of
cases have granted reduced damages for non-willful failures to convey good title
but full damages for willful failures due to a recognition that there are many
possible causes for title to not be marketable that are not the seller's fault.'' But
there is a split of authority on this with some still allowing benefit of the bargain
damages." 2 In addition, some courts rule that a buyer of real estate is not
prevented from recovering her out-of-pocket expenses when a party breaches for
failing to convey title in good faith.' 13 But this Article does not focus on a seller
who breaches because she, in good faith, was unable to convey marketable title.
Instead, this Article focuses on situations where the defaulting seller has used the
limitation of the buyer's remedies clause in order to strategically default (i.e.,
cancel any deal when the property appreciates in value or the seller discovers the
property is worth more than the contract price) or situations involving a breach
for other reasons beneficial to the seller (such as increased costs to perform

under Virginia law (the choice of law in the contract), notwithstanding the language in the contract,
if a seller has acted in bad faith in originally undertaking to convey title, or has voluntarily disabled
[himself] from making such a conveyance," then the limitation-of-remedy clause is inoperative, and
the buyer is still entitled to sue for specific performance or benefit of the bargain damages);
Kooloian v. Suburban Land Co., 873 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I. 2005) ("This Court consistently has held
that in the absence of 'fraud, bad faith, illegality, misconduct, or any other factor that might alter
the legal relationship of these parties,' damages for the breach of a contract to purchase real estate
are limited in accordance with the terms of the contract." (quoting Chapman v. Vendresca, 426
A.2d 262, 264 (R.I. 1981))).
107. SeeKooloian, 873 A.2d at 99-100.
108. Id. at 95.
109. Id. at 99-100.
110. Id.at 100.
111. See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 60.11, at 688-92 & 691 nn. 13-14
(rev. ed. 2005).
112. See, e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. 1982) (purchaser entitled to
benefit of the bargain damages where vendor breaches executory contract to convey real property
regardless ofvender's good faith); Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771, 777 (Utah 1977) ("[B]enefit-of-the
bargain damages are to be awarded for breach .... regardless of the good faith of the party in
breach .. " Recovery is not limited to actual pocket expenses merely because breach was in good,
rather than bad faith.).
113. See, e.g., Brown v. Yacht Club of Couer d'Alene, Ltd., 722 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1986) (awarding out-of-pocket expenses for vendor's inability to deliver marketable title).
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beyond what the seller anticipated)." 4
The court in Goodwin v. Hole No. 4 LLC exemplifies the approach of
enforcing contract clauses that expressly provide for a limitation of remedy; the
Goodwin court narrowly interprets what is procedural and substantive
unconscionability, while potentially providing a "bad faith" exception to
enforcement of the clause if it is shown that the seller exercised it because the
property appreciated in value." 5 Because the court in Goodwin engaged in
mental gymnastics and faulty common assumptions to justify enforcing a highly
unfair contract limitation clause against a consumer who was likely deceived into
entering into the purchase contract, we engage in a thorough analysis of the
details of this decision.
In Goodwin, the buyer agreed to buy, and the seller agreed to build and sell
to the buyer, a home adjacent to a golf course." 6 The contract provided that if
the buyer defaulted, the seller could elect either to retain the earnest money as
liquidated damages or pursue specific performance instead." 7 However, if the
seller defaulted, buyer's sole and exclusive remedy was to receive a return of
buyer's earnest money, plus 10% interest on the earnest money from the date of
deposit. "8 The buyers argued that they thought the limitation-of-remedy clause
was only intended for unintentional defaults by the seller, and they could still sue
for specific performance if the seller intentionally defaulted." 9 The court ruled
that there was no ambiguity on intent regarding when this clause would apply
based on the clear limitation-of-remedies language in the contract and were
dismissive of the buyers' claim that they misunderstood the limitation of remedy
clause, noting that the entire contract had been explained to the buyers by the
broker. 20 The court also ruled that a letter the buyer received from the broker
about locking in the price of the unit by signing the contract did not create
ambiguity relating to the limitation-of-remedy clause in the contract.' Although
the court acknowledged "that Utah courts endeavor to construe contracts so as
not to grant one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a
contract," the court found that the limitation of remedies clause did not do this
because the seller would still have to return to the buyer the earnest money they
paid, plus interest, and because the buyers also had a right to terminate the
contract if they failed to obtain financing or if they disapproved certain
disclosures.' 2 2 The court also rejected the buyers' argument that the limitationof-remedies clause was an unenforceable liquidated damages clause because the

114. Goodwin v. Hole No. 4, L.L.C., No. 2:06-cv-00679, 2007 WL 2221066, at *10-11 (D.
Utah July 31, 2007).
115. Id. at *I11-13.
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117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3, *6.
Id. at *7-8.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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clause simply provided for a return of earnest money rather than an agreed upon
measure of damages. 23 The court also rejected the buyers' argument that the
seller breached Utah's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because
"this [implied] covenant cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with express
contractual terms."' 124 In this instance, because the parties had bargained for the
limitation-of-remedy clause, "it would be unjustified for [the buyers] to expect
more than ...the return of their earnest money plus ten percent. The parties
contracted specifically for the purpose of allowing [the seller] to use [this
contract provision] as an escape valve.' 25
The court also ruled that there was no evidence of substantive
26
unconscionability or that the seller had engaged in a deceptive act or practice. 1
The court noted the heavy burden and very demanding test required for a finding
that certain terms of a contract are substantively unconscionable: "the terms must
be so one-sided as to oppress an innocent party. The situation must be
conscience-shocking or 'one in which no decent, fair-minded person would view
the results without being possessed of a profound sense of injustice. '127 The
court further noted that even if the court were to find the clause "to be wholly
' 28
unreasonable, this would not alone establish substantive[] unconscionability."'
The court added that there was no indication that the clause left "a harsh or
unreasonable effect on the Goodwins" since they had the remedy of return of
their earnest money plus 10% interest, and the buyers could have bargained for
29
a different remedies provision but instead agreed to the provision as written.
The buyer also argued that the clause violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices
Act ("UCSPA") because the clause allowed the seller to "pick its deal"; if
property appreciated in value between when the contract was signed and closing,
the seller could terminate without incurring liability for damages and sell to
someone else for more, and if the property stayed the same or depreciated in
value, the seller could close with the buyer at the contracted for purchase price. 30
The court emphasized that the seller had a legitimate reason for this limitation-ofbuyer remedy clause for the buyer: the seller had difficulty estimating the costs
to perform the construction of the home due to the location of the home on a
hilltop and, thus, needed this limitation of remedy to extricate itself from the
contract should the construction costs exceed the purchase price.' The court
noted there was no evidence that the seller used the limitation-of-remedy clause
to get out of the deal in order to sell to another party for a higher price-i.e., if
the clause were used by the seller to "pick its deal" based on appreciation or

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *6.
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depreciation of the value of the property. 3 2 The court seemed to imply that such
deal-picking could be the basis for finding that a seller took advantage of another
party in violation of the UCSPA: "Because there is no evidence [the seller]
actually used [the return of earnest money and interest penalty] to take advantage
of any33party, the [buyers'] argument fails to support any inference of bad
faith.'
The court also ruled that there was no evidence of procedural
unconscionability. 134 The court noted six relevant factors for a finding of
procedural unconscionability, which focus on the manner in which the parties
entered into the contract and whether it led to the complaining party having no
meaningful choice:
(1) whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms and conditions of the agreement; (2) whether there was a lack of
opportunity for meaningful negotiation; (3) whether the agreement was
printed on a duplicate or boilerplate form drafted solely by the party in
the strongest bargaining position; (4) whether the terms of the agreement
were explained to the weaker party; (5) whether the aggrieved party had
a meaningful choice or instead felt compelled to accept the terms of the
agreement; and (6) whether the stronger party employed deceptive
practices to obscure key contractual provisions. 131
In applying these factors to the facts of the case, the court stated that the buyers'
strongest argument for finding procedural unconscionability was that the contract
differed from the state's approved form of purchase and sale agreement, which
stated in bold-face type at the top of the contract that such form was required by
Utah law. 3 6 The court stated that this might have caused the buyers not to have
a "reasonable opportunity to understand the terms," or that the seller ' had
"employed deceptive practices to obscure key contractual provisions." 13 1
However, the court stated there was no evidence that the seller was the stronger
party in the bargain because a broker represented the buyers. 38 In addition, the
court noted that the broker had told the buyers that the contract "had been
modified, flagging the specific modified provisions," including the clause
limiting the buyer's remedy in the event of the seller's failure to perform.' 39 The
court presumed that the broker had also "reviewed each of the terms of the [the
real estate purchase contract] with the [buyers]."' 4 ° The court also rejected a
finding of procedural unconscionability based on the letter from the broker to the
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Id. at *11.
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buyers stating that the buyers could lock in the purchase price by entering into
the contract. The court ruled there was no indication that the seller had reason
to know the buyers were relying on that letter to think they were locking in the
purchase price since the express terms in the purchase contract superseded other
previous agreements. 4 ' The court ruled that this contract language made any
such reliance on the letter "unreasonable. 1 4 ' Finally, the court noted that there
may not have even been a conflict with the letter; if the seller had not exercised
its right to terminate by returning the earnest money and 10% interest, the buyers
could have purchased the unit for the43 contracted for purchase price, hence,
locking in the purchase price amount. 1
There are many problems with the Goodwin court's reasoning and
application of laws to the facts in the case. The first area of critique relates to the
"facts" that the court relied upon in interpreting the parties' intent relating to the
limitation ofremedies clause. The court accepted the seller's allegations that the
broker "summarized the terms of the [contract]" and in a later telephone
conversation "explained all of the [contract]'s provisions to the Goodwins."'"
We find these "facts" to be highly implausible. The real estate purchase contract
at issue was based on the Utah state form purchase contract, which is six pages
long and single-spaced. 145 It would take at least twenty minutes to simply look
at each of the words in the contract, let alone take time to stop and try to think
about the impact of these words and which options in the form contract to
choose. The amount of time it takes to fully comprehend the contract would also
have to include the time it takes to explain what rights the parties would have
absent these contract terms and how the terms change these rights. To make it
all concrete, the explainer would have to provide examples of scenarios of how
problems could arise, how those problems would be resolved if the contract were
silent, and how the express contract terms would resolve these problems. The
first author of this Article devotes at least fifteen to twenty hours of class time
in her law school real estate transactions courses to review the laws that relate to
the terms of typical home purchase contracts, review various typical scenarios of
issues that can arise, and consider how different contract terms can affect the
rights and obligations of the parties under these scenarios. She spends at least
three hours on contract remedies clauses and remedies laws, generally, since
these areas of the law are highly complicated. It is unlikely that real estate
brokers are trained at the same level as attorneys on all of these laws and how the
contract terms can affect the rights of the parties. It is also unlikely that a broker
could impart all of this explanation to a buyer when "reviewing" the contract
terms with the buyer.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.

UTAH REAL ESTATE COMM'N & OFFICE OF UTAH AT ATTORNEY GEN., REAL ESTATE
PURCHASE CONTRACT (effective Aug. 27, 2008) [hereinafter REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT],

availableat http://realestate.utah.gov/forms/REPC_2008.pdf.
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Furthermore, the buyer's assertion that they lacked an understanding of the
meaning of the "clear" language (clear at least to any good lawyer) in the
contract that limited their remedies in the event of the seller's breach'46 rings as
authentic in light of the results of our Remedies Experiment reported in Part H.
Adding to the buyer's difficulty in understanding the limitation of remedies
clause here is the fact that the clause does not expressly spell out that failure to
keep the construction costs within the seller's estimate is a basis for the seller to
terminate the contract. The purchaser was probably completely unaware of this
risk and did not think of this possibility when reading that portion of the
contract. 147 If the main or sole purpose of the broad termination clause was to
address the possibility of construction costs exceeding estimates, then why not
specify this in the contract, as the contract narrowly specifies the buyer's right
to terminate with no liability if the buyer fails to obtain financing? 48 Perhaps the
seller did not want the buyer to be aware of the risk of locking in purchase price.
The court's assertion that the parties had "bargained" for the limitation-ofremedy clause in the contract 149 is also highly questionable. The buyers signed
the contract, and the contract contained the limitation-of-remedies clause, but this
does not necessarily mean that both parties had "bargained" for this term, or, as
the court concluded, that the parties had done so to allow the seller to escape
liability in the event of high construction costs. Clearly the seller, who reduced
50
the full range of remedies from that provided in the standard form contract,
intended it, but there is no evidence that the buyer intended this change or had
"bargained" for this result. In general, when a seller is a professional developer,
and the buyer is a consumer/home buyer, the seller provides the contract form
and the parties typically only negotiate or customize the purchase price, closing
date, and amount and interest rate of the loan. 5 ' It appears that the majority of

146.
147.
148.
149.

Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066 at *3, *6.
Id. at *6, *11.
Id. at *8.
Id.

150. See REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, supranote 145. Brokers were required to use

the statutory standard form contract, but the parties could modify. The form provided for, at the
buyer's election, one of the following remedies: (a) cancellation of the contract and, in addition to
return of the buyer's earnest money, a sum equal to the earnest money deposit; (b) sue the seller to
specifically enforce the contract; or (c) accept a return of the earnest money and pursue any other
remedies available under the law. Id. 16.2.
151. See infra note 267 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts found that
brokers can fill in the blanks of form purchase agreements); see also Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131,
135 (R.I. 1989) ("We note that as the written contract was to be drawn up by the realtors, the parties
and their realtors had to discuss what was to be stated in the written agreement. The purchase-andsales-agreement form is a standardized document, but nevertheless a real estate agent must fill in
the blanks. To fill in the blanks, the appropriate information must be discussed by the parties and
their agents."); Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 35 N.E.2d 435,437 (Ohio 1941) (describing
the blanks that get filled in as "the supplying of simple, factual material such as the date, the price,
the name of the purchaser, the location of the property, the date of giving possession and the
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home buyers in the United States do not have an attorney representing them in
the negotiation of the terms of the purchase contracts,152 and most likely only
skim the lengthy purchase agreements they sign; as reflected in our Remedies
Experiment, those buyers who carefully read and analyze the typical limitationof-remedies clauses do not understand what rights they are giving up when
agreeing to this clause. In general, the court's statement that the parties could
have bargained for a different remedy clause, while technically true, is not
reflective of the reality of the experience of home purchase transactions for the
vast majority of home purchasers."'
Courts need to engage in this fiction because buyers could otherwise argue
that they failed to read or understand any term of the contract that they later
regret, thus, eroding the goal of certainty of contract.154 Although courts may
need, in the typical case, to engage in this fiction, they should be aware that it is,
in fact, a fiction; in cases where the terms are very unreasonable and one-sided,
courts should keep this fiction in mind. In this case, that fiction is further
buttressed by the fact that the letter from the broker discussing a set purchase
price induced the buyer to enter into the contract-the very opposite of what they
in fact accomplished when they signed this contract due to the wording of the
limitation-of-remedy clause.'5 5 The broker, who allegedly "explained all of the
[contract's] provisions" to the buyers, likely did not fully inform the buyers that
this limitation-of-remedies clause could permit the seller to terminate the deal for
any reason, nor did the seller likely expressly disclose to the buyer that the seller6
could cancel the deal if the construction costs exceeded the seller's estimates. 11
Because the seller could terminate the contract under this clause for any reason
with little consequence, this clause eroded the buyer's basic goal of entering into
the contract to lock in a specific purchase price for the property.
Perhaps if the court had better understood that few consumers understand the
remedy clauses when they read them-as evidenced by the Remedies Experiment
in Part II-and how little information the broker likely explained to
them-compared with what a good attorney would-the court might not have

duration of the offer requires ordinary intelligence rather than the skill peculiar to one trained and
experienced in the law."). This supports the likelihood that other than those blanks, the parties to
a contract are unlikely to discuss and negotiate other points in the contract, especially if the buyer
does not hire an attorney to review the contract.
152. See infranote 267 and accompanying text (noting that many states permit brokers to fill
in form purchase contracts and do not require an attorney to represent the home buyer with the
contract formation); Braunstein & Genn, supra note 10, at 471 (stating at least 59% of the home
buyers in their Ohio study were not represented by an attorney).
153. As Justice Holmes famously noted, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience." O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
154. See Howard Gensier, The CompetitiveMarket Model ofContracts,99 COM. L.J. 384,388
(1994) (discussing the need for certainty in contracting).
155. Goodwin v. Hole No. 4, LLC, No. 2:06-cv-00679, 2007 WL 2221066, at *2, *8 (D.Utah
July 31, 2007).
156. Id.
at *2.
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concluded that the buyer had bargained for this limitation-of-remedy or was
unjustified in expecting more than what was expressly provided by the limited
remedy.'5 7 The buyers asserted that they thought they could sue for specific
performance. 5 They thought that the clause limiting their remedy only related
to defaults that the seller could not avoid-i.e., if the seller did not have good
title to the real estate through no fault of their own.'59 Although the language in
the clause seems clear to attorneys, the results from the Remedies Experiment
indicate that many consumers do not really understand how this type of clause
affects their rights when the seller defaults and that buyers tend to have a high
expectation of their right to force a defaulting seller to specifically perform the
contract. 6 ° Also, because the seller reserved the right to demand specific
performance upon the buyer's default this may have caused the buyers to assume
they would have similar rights. 6 '
The Goodwin case also underscores the very narrow band of protection that
is afforded to consumers/home buyers when they enter into form contracts
prepared by sophisticated developers.
As the court noted, "[W]holly
unreasonable" terms that "severely limit[] their legal remedies while providing
advantages to [the seller]" do not establish substantive unconscionability, as there
is a high burden for a contract term to be considered unconscionable.' 6 2
Although this Article critiques the Goodwin court's articulation of the
unconscionability test, as applied to consumer-business transactions, most courts
have adopted this test.'63 Regardless, the court's dicta in Goodwin that there was
no indication that the clause harshly or unreasonably impacted the buyers
because they could pursue the refund of their earnest money as a remedy, plus
10% interest; such rationale reflects the failure of courts to recall and place
appropriate emphasis on the default rights a buyer is ordinarily entitled to if a
contract were silent on this issue. 1" The law provides buyers of real estate a
right to compel the seller to sell to the buyer at the contracted purchase price
("specific performance") because real estate is considered to be unique; this right
is the essence of what has been bargained for in the contract.' 65 Thus, by limiting
the buyers here to the return of their own money, the limitation-of-remedies
clause takes away this critical right of specific performance. In addition, if the
buyer can show that the fair market value of the property exceeds the contract
price, the buyer can, instead, sue for this difference as "expectation interest"

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3, *6-7.
Remedies Experiment, supra note 8.
Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *2; see also ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 17-56 (rev. ed. 2007) (discussing reciprocity effects and
expectations).
162. Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *10.
163. See RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2012).
164. Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *2, *10.
165. See 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance§ 55 (2013).
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damages instead of seeking specific performance.' 66 This right was also taken
away under the limitation-of-remedies clause-an important remedy if the
seller's title to the real estate is seriously impaired. The buyers in Goodwin did
not appear to present evidence on the fair market value of the property they had
contracted to purchase because specific performance does not require this
evidence, as opposed to expectation damages. 6 7 This does not mean that the
limitation-of-remedies clause did not have a profound negative impact on the
buyer's rights as a consequence of the seller's failure to perform under the
contract. In addition to what is lost by the limitation clause, the court overemphasized the buyer's remaining contractual remedies.' 6 8 However, the remedy
of returning of the buyer's own earnest money arguably provides no real
"contractual" remedy at all. If a buyer deposits money with a seller or a third
party-unless that money were in the nature of consideration for an option to
purchase or a gift to the seller-either as security for the buyer's performance or
to apply to the purchase price, when the buyer has performed and the seller fails
to close, the money is the buyer's and the seller is indebted to the buyer for the
amount deposited with the seller.'69 This obligation to repay the earnest money
exists without a clause in the contract calling for his return of money as the
buyer's sole "contract remedy" or the seller will be unjustly enriched. 7 ° The
only true added remedy in the Goodwin case was requiring the seller to provide
interest on the earnest money at 10% if that rate exceeded market rates at the
time. 171
The court's conclusion that there was no evidence of bad faith in the case is
also problematic.' As previously noted, the contract remedies language failed
to expressly address the situation of construction costs exceeding the purchase
price. 17 If this were the sole or main purpose for the limitation-of-remedies
clause in the event the seller failed to close, then the contract clause should have
expressly been limited to this or other intended scenarios. This change is
necessary to put the buyers on better notice that their deal is conditioned upon the
construction costs not exceeding the seller's estimates and would act similarly
to a contract explicitly conditioning the closing upon the buyer's ability to obtain

166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
167. Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *7-8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347
(1981).
168. Goodwin, 2007 WL 22221066, at *10.
169. Although the return of this money is also covered under the contractual remedy of
restitution, it has been construed as in the nature of recovering a debt owed to the purchaser when
it was given to the purchaser to be applied to the purchase price. Kopis v. Savage, 498 N.E.2d
1266, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See also STOEBUCK& WHITMAN, supra note 44, § 10.4, at 734
("[T]he buyer who seeks a refund of earnest money is arguably not relying on contract rights, but
is merely asking relief from the seller's unjust enrichment.").
170. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 44, § 10.4, at 734.
171. Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *6.
172. Id. at *9, *11.
173. Id. at *2-3.

2013]

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

financing. Such a change contrasts with a broadly worded termination right that
implicitly encompasses a contemplated risk. By creating the broad-based right
to terminate without liability, the seller reserves the right to make any number of
post hoc justifications for terminating as a defense to the buyer's argument about
whether the seller terminated in order to take advantage of a better offer. The
limitation-of-remedies clause is also problematic because it does not include a
bad faith exception.'74 This failure may evidence an intention by the seller to
reserve the right to use the clause in an opportunistic fashion-to terminate if the
fair market value of the property has gone up. The Goodwin court could have
ruled that the clause, since not so expressly limited, created an illusory
agreement-as courts in Florida have.'75
The Goodwin court only briefly applied some of the facts of the case to the
law relating to procedural unconscionability. 7' 6 The court focused on the seller's
change of the Utah approved form of contract as a basis for the buyers to argue
that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contact or to argue that the seller engaged in deceptive acts.' The court was
correct to point out that the broker informed the buyer that the standard form had
been revised, but as previously noted, the court placed too much reliance on the
broker's ability-and perhaps desire-to inform the buyers of the legal
consequences of these changes relevant to the remedies issue.' In addition, the
court placed far too much weight on the fact that the buyers received
"representation" from the broker and, thus, might have been the "stronger party
in the bargain."' 79 To the contrary, it is highly likely that the seller/developer
here was represented by an attorney. This attorney would likely have advised the
seller on how to revise the standard form purchase contract to better cover the
seller's interests, as contrasted with how the broker "helped" the buyer here. A
real estate developer, whose business includes routinely entering into purchase
contracts and who undoubtedly had legal counsel relating to the development, is
clearly a more sophisticated party than a buyer who may have never before
entered into a purchase contract and who apparently did not have the benefit of
a lawyer's advice at the time the buyers entered into the contract. Hence, the
court misapplied the "stronger party" factor in analyzing the procedural
unconscionability claim. 80 Finally, as previously noted, the court did not place
adequate weight on the impact of the broker's letter to the buyers which stated
the buyers should enter into a contract to lock in the purchase price.' 8' The court
wrongly concluded that the buyers did not "reasonabl[y]" rely on the letter

174.
175.
1985).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.at*9, *11.
See, e.g., Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *10-12.
Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id.
Id.at*8, *12.
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because the contract contained terms stating that the contract superseded any and
all other previous agreements. 182 In another law review article, we demonstrated
the unfairness of this type of conclusion in light of the psychological realities of
consumers' likely comprehension of contract terms, and basing a fraud or
deceptive practices act claim on such a presumption creates a license to
deceive.' 83 Perhaps the weakest point of the court's analysis of the procedural
unconscionability claim was the court's conclusion that there may not have been
a conflict between the contract terms and the letter because if the seller had not
exercised its right to terminate, the buyers could have purchased the unit for the
contracted-for purchase price. 184 If the termination right had been very narrow
in scope there might be some validity to this statement. But because the contract
clause broadly provided the seller with a right of termination, that right
contradicts the lock-in statement promised in the letter.
A final critique of the Goodwin decision is whether courts should require
evidence of "bad faith"--defined by the court as the seller using the limitationof-remedy clause to "pick its deal" based on property valuation or better
offers-to rule that the type of limitation-of-remedy clause in Goodwin is
unenforceable.' 85 Courts, arguably, should refuse to enforce a limitation of buyer
remedies, when the seller is provided very adequate remedies to address their
losses, even if the seller is not trying to use the clause to "pick its deal.' 86 The
buyer will, in a typical deal, suffer a loss of out-of-pocket expenses and, in some
cases, loss of expectation damages or consequential damages when the seller fails
to close and terminates the contract, regardless of whether the failure to close is
in bad faith. Loss of the right to specific performance is a major waiver of a right
and, as noted earlier, courts should not enforce when the buyer has waived other
remedies, while the seller retains important remedies.
The Washington Supreme Court in Torgersonv. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, 87
also ruled that a contract clause clearly limiting the buyer's remedy to return of
her own earnest money, while the seller's remedy was retention of the earnest
money, was enforceable and not unconscionable. 188 The special and unique facts
in Torgerson, however, better justify this ruling than in Goodwin. In addressing
the procedural unconscionability claim, the Torgerson court noted that the
purchasers were real estate brokers who were marketing the sales of units in the
building 189 and that they negotiated for certain changes to the form contract
regarding the interior finish, color schemes, and due dates and amount for the

182. Id.
183. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual
Myths Despite PsychologicalRealities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 617, 707-10 (2009).
184. Goodwin, 2007 WL 2221066, at *12.
185. ld.at *11.
186. Id.
187. 210 P.3d 318 (Wash. 2009) (en banc).
188. Id. at 320, 324-25.
189. Id. at 323.
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earnest money deposit.19 ° In addressing the substantive unconscionability claim,
the court emphasized the very low security deposit paid by the buyers/brokers
and that the buyer would pay the bulk of their security deposit seven days before
closing or even at the closing.'9 1 The court inferred from these facts that these
buyers agreed to the extreme limitation of their remedies in exchange for the low
initial security deposits and had better opportunities to negotiate the contract than
typical home buyers. 92 Although not expressly noted by the court, it would also
be fair to infer that these buyers/brokers were far more familiar with the terms of
the developer's form contract and more likely to have a sense of the remedies the
buyers were giving up. The amount they initially deposited was only $5000 for
' The court assumed, perhaps correctly, that the brokers agreed to the
each unit. 93
extreme limitation-of-remedy for the seller's breach in exchange for the
buyers'/brokers' low initial deposit-$5000-as earnest money.'94 The normal
earnest money deposited to estimate a seller's damages for a buyer's breach is in
the range of 5-10% of the purchase price, and here the $5000 deposit is only
1.5% of the $332,220 purchase price for one buyer/broker and 0.37% of the
$1,318,000 purchase price for the other buyer/broker.'95 The brokers also,
however, pledged the commissions they would have earned at closing as part of
their security deposit, thus, respectively increasing the deposits to 5% and 10%
of these purchase prices.'96 Assuming that the commissions were only for this
deal, although the case is not clear on this point,' 97 the court would be correct to
point out that the very small amount of money the buyers deposited-the rest of
the deposit apparently not being payable until closing of this deal) justified them
having very limited remedies upon the seller's default. 98 But if the assignment
was of commissions owed to these brokers for other deals, then this was valuable
consideration and much more within the normal range (although not being paid
up front, as is typical), and there would be a substantial imbalance in remedies.
Notwithstanding the appropriateness of the result in Torgerson-i.e., the
court was upholding a true bargain made between sophisticated parties-the case

190. Id. Some contracts, those created later, only limited buyers from obtaining consequential
damages or punitive damages. Id. at 321.
191. Id.at323.
192. Id.
193. Id. The court does not clarify whether the commission relates to the sale of these two
units or other units they acted as brokers on. If it is for other units that they would be owed a
commission on, then the earnest money adding up to 5% ofthe purchase price for one broker/buyer,
and 10% for the other broker/buyer, is in fact a significant sum of money, and the argument that
there was no substantive unconscionability under the facts of this case is less strong.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 324.
197. The court stated, "[T]he Buyers negotiated to pay the rest of the deposits in commissions
from their work as agents for the condominium development, and that money was due only seven
days prior to closing or at closing." Id. at 323.
198. Id. at 323-24.
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has some problematic dicta. First, although the court noted that under
Washington law, a clause that unilaterally and severely limits the remedies of one
side is substantively unconscionable for denying any meaningful remedy, 9 9 the
court declined to rule on whether the doctrine ofunconscionability applies to real
estate transactions in the State of Washington.2"' In addition, even when the
court analyzed whether the contract remedy clause was unconscionable, its
statement--"both sides are limited to the retention or return of deposits in case
of breach" 2°-seemed to imply that this was a remedy that was mutually
beneficial to the non-breaching party and detrimental to the non-breaching party.
The court continued, "To be sure, the deposits come out of Buyers' pockets; but
at $5,000 the promise of real estate commissions payable upon closing, the
deposits are not so insignificant a sum as to foreclose legal action., 20 2 It is true
that the non-defaulting buyer here will want his $5000 deposit back, but that is
still only a return of the buyer's own money, as is the return of the commission
for work done on other deals. The buyer would be receiving a meaningful
remedy here with the return of the commissions he pledged to the seller only if
the commission for this closing was due to the buyer/broker even upon seller's
breach of this contract.
A second category of dicta that is problematic in the Torgerson case relates
to its treatment of possible UCC remedies protections. The court stated that just
because case law in the state has adopted UCC law on the disclaimer of the
warranty of habitability for construction contracts, it does not mean that this
court would extend UCC remedy protections to real estate contracts.0 3
Nevertheless, the court addressed remedies laws "[u]nder the UCC, indicating
that under the UCC, general remedies may be available where 'circumstances
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose. ',24 The
court noted that commentary for this section of the UCC states that parties are
free to shape their remedies, and reasonable agreements limiting them are to be
given effect. 20 5 Although the court refused to extend UCC remedial provisions
to this real estate transaction, it proceeded to conclude that the remedies clause
here would satisfy the UCC test.2 16 The court stated, "[s]ince Buyers get their
deposits back, along with certain sums paid for improvements on the units, they
are not left without 'a fair quantum of remedy' as is the concern of the UCC in
a goods context.""2 7 This interpretation of the UCC remedial provisions is highly
problematic since it provides that the grant of only rescission/restitution to the
non-breaching party and potentially much greater remedies to the other breaching
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Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.at 325.
Id. (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.2-719 (2013)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
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party is still "a fair quantum of remedy., 20 8 The court failed to limit this dicta to
the setting where the other party is also severely limited in its remedies or if the
other party who has waived contractual remedy rights has been given other
valuable consideration for their waiver.
Finally, the Torgerson court's reasoning in its ruling that the contract
remedies clause did not violate public policy is also flawed. 9 The buyer
correctly pointed out that limiting the buyer's sole remedy for the seller's default
to a refund of the buyer's earnest money, or other sums paid by the buyer,
encourages sellers to engage in more strategic defaults, and enforcement of such
a clause would therefore "be injurious to the public. 21 0 In response, the court
stated, "[T]he remedies limitations can cause either these Buyers or Sellers to
bear the risk of the other party's breach, depending on changes in the housing
market .... '[T]his agreed upon allocation of risk, which limits liability for both
parties, does not violate public policy." 211 Again, the court treats the limitationof-remedies clauses as being comparable, but the buyer would have to experience
a loss greater than at least $5000 plus transactions costs, to benefit from a
strategic default, while the seller would only have to lose $1, plus transaction
costs, to benefit from a strategic default.1 2
Courts in Florida have taken a different approach and have embraced the
argument that a clause that limits the home purchaser to the remedy of return of
the buyer's earnest money upon seller's default creates an illusory contract,
permitting the seller "to breach with impunity., 213 Thus, the court in PortLargo
Club, Inc. v. Warren, held that this type of clause was unenforceable and would
permit the buyer to obtain the remedy of specific performance 21 4 or benefit of the
bargain damages, 215 notwithstanding the limitation-of-remedy clause in the
contract, when the seller breached the contract. The court stated that "[p]ersons
may limit their liability by contract, but such provisions must be reasonable to be
enforced., 216 Because the court noted that this type of clause "renders the
seller's obligation wholly illusory and would permit him to breach with
impunity," the court concluded that .'such provisions are antithetical to the
concept of fair dealing in the marketplace and will not be enforced by courts of

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citation omitted).
212. Id. at 323.
213. See, e.g., Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
214. The court did not actually award a remedy of specific performance but instead remanded
the cause for a new trial to determine damages. Id.at 1334.
215. Id. at 1333. The buyer did not obtain the benefit of the bargain damages in this case
because the buyer failed to provide evidence of the difference between the fair market value of the
property on the date of the breach compared with the contract price. Id.at 1334.
216. Id. at 1333.
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law.'" 2 17 The court also stated that to obtain benefit of the bargain damages, the
breaching party must have breached in bad faith, which the court initially defined
as the opposite of good faith
and later seemed to define as being without any
"reasonable justification. ' ' 218 The court noted that the time-share units under
contract had increased substantially in value, and because the seller failed to
provide reasonable justification for the failure to complete the closing, the court
deemed this failure to close was lacking good faith.2 19
The Florida Court of Appeals in Blue Lakes Apartments, Ltd. v. George
Gowing, Inc.,22° similarly ruled that although parties to a contract may agree to
limit their respective remedies and that the remedies still available to each party
need not be the same, the "contractual provisions.., must be reasonable to be
enforced., 221' The court ruled that a contract clause limiting for the buyer's sole
remedy to the return of the buyer's earnest money, while the seller's sole remedy
is limited to retention of the earnest money, constituted a "heads-l-win, tails-youlose approach to defaults . . . so rapaciously skewed as to be patently
unreasonable. 222 The court also characterized this type of limitation-of-remedies
clause as a subversion of contract that "permit[s] one party to breach with
impunity, [causing] the seller's obligations to become wholly illusory, while the
buyers' are quite real" (the buyer had deposited 10% of the purchase price as its
security deposit in this case). 223 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
award of benefit of the bargain damages and did not require a showing of bad
faith. 224 In support of its similar conclusion that this type of limitation-ofremedies clause creates an illusory contract, the Florida court in Ocean Dunes of
22 5 noted that the "return of
Hutchinson IslandDevelopment Corp. v. Colangelo,
one's own money hardly constitutes damages in any meaningful sense., 226 The
court in Ocean Dunes therefore ruled that "the contract provide [d] no reasonable
remedy for its breach," and affirmed the trial court's ordering the equitable
remedy of specific performance for the buyer.227
The court inldevco, Inc. v. Hobaugh,2 8 also ruled that when the buyer's sole

217. Id. (quoting Blue Lakes Apartments, Ltd. v. George Gowing, Inc., 464 So. 2d 705 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
218. Id. at 1333-34.
219. Id.at 1334.
220. 464 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
221. Id.at 709.
222. Id.
223. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Id.The court did mention that the seller had sold the property to a third party but noted
this in the context of answering why the trial court did not award specific performance. Id. The
court also mentioned the purchase price of the property in a sale to a third party in the context of
affirming the trial court's calculation of benefit of the bargain damages. Id.
225. 463 So. 2d 437 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
226. Id.
at 439.
227. Id.
at 440.
228. 571 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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remedy is return of her earnest money, and the seller's sole remedy is retention
of the buyer's earnest money, there is a lack of mutuality of obligation, and the
limitation-of-remedies clause was therefore void. 229 However, in Idevco, it was
the buyer who was in breach of contract-not the seller.23 ° Consequently, the
court affirmed the trial court's order that the seller return the buyer's earnest
money deposit, but noted that "when a default provision of a purchase agreement
is invalid ... the nondefaulting [party (here the seller)] is entitled to prove and
232
recover actual damages. 231 The court in Hackett v. J.R.L. Development, Inc.
also ruled that the buyer in default would not lose his earnest money under a
similar contract remedies limitation clause because the clause was invalid for
lack of mutuality of obligation. 23 3 The seller could still recover its actual
damages from the breach by properly pleading and proving actual damages.3
The trial court concluded that the remedy was reasonable because the buyer
would also be entitled, under other portions of the contract, to the interest
generated from the security deposit in the event of the seller's default (similar to
the Utah District court's ruling in Goodwin).235 The appellate court disagreed
because "[t]he interest [wa]s earned on the buyers' money; thus, the seller ha[d]
237
no real obligation., 236 The court in Terraces of Boca Associates v. Gladstein
also ruled that a similar contract limitation-of-remedies clause was invalid and
unenforceable due to the "unreasonable disparity in remedy alternatives available
to [the] seller and buyers," and, therefore, the buyers in breach were entitled to
the return of their deposit.2 38 The court did not address whether a seller could
recover actual damages when a buyer is in breach, but the contract remedies
clause invalidly attempts to grant to the 23seller
the option to return the earnest
9
money or sue instead for actual damages.
In light of these Florida cases, it appears that a clause limiting the buyer's
sole remedy to return of its earnest money but allowing the seller the remedy of
retention of the buyer's earnest money, will not be enforced under Florida law.

229. Id. at 489-90.
230. Id. at 490.
231. Id.
232. 566 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
233. Id. at 603.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 543 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
238. Id. at 1304. The limitation-of-remedies clause in this case was even more unfair than the
paradigm clause since the remedies limitation not only limited the buyers' sole remedy to return of
its earnest money, it also granted the seller the right to choose between retaining the earnest money
as liquidated damages or pursuing actual damages or equitable remedies, which is considered an
invalid option in some states, causing the seller to forfeit the right to make the election. Id. at 1303.
239. Id.; see also Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chi. v. Thorpe, 741 N.E.2d 651,
657-58 (Il1. App. Ct. 2000); Grossinger Motorcorp, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 607
N.E.2d 1337, 1346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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However, there are two Florida cases that may have taken a less protective
approach. The court in Greenstein v. Greenbrook,Ltd.2 4' enforced a limitationof-remedies clause that prohibited both parties from bringing a claim of specific
performance for the other party's breach, ruling that it was mutual and
reasonable.2 4' Although the court focused on the portion of the remedies clause
that provided for the mutual agreement relating to specific performance, the
clause also stated that the buyer's "full and complete settlement of all claims
against Seller" in the event of the seller's default was "a full refund of all monies
..paid to Seller" by the buyer.2 42 Further, the seller's remedy was retaining the
monies paid by the buyer as liquidated damages. 43 The court failed to address
this fact except in a footnote where it stated that it had "not decided whether [the
buyer] in an action for damages upon Seller's default, would be limited to the
244
return of his deposit, where Seller's default was shown to be in bad faith."
However, the court then cited a prior Florida case that allowed recovery beyond
the return of the buyer's earnest money when there was a finding of bad faith on
the seller's part.2 45 Although unclear, this court may have indicated it would
enforce this type of limitation of liability clause except upon a showing of bad
faith. Indeed, in the PortLargo Club case, in the same district, the court ruled
three years later that in order to obtain benefit of the bargain damages, there must
be a showing of bad faith.246
The second Florida case with a less protective approach was Developers of
Solamar,LLC v. Weinhauer. 47 The contract in Solamar included an exception
to the limitation of the buyer's remedies in the event of the seller's willful breach
of the contract.248 In light of this, the court concluded that this default clause did
not "fail for lack of mutuality" of obligation in that the buyer could seek his
actual damages if the seller had willfully failed to perform. 249 "As such, [the
250
seller] could not have breached the terms of the contract 'with impunity.'
While this is accurate, an argument could still be made, as raised earlier, that
whether the seller breached for a cause beyond its control or with impunity, the
buyer's losses exist in both situations. Thus, if the seller has reserved more
meaningful remedies for a buyer default, a court might find that the buyer's lack
of remedy creates an unreasonable limitation of liability or unconscionable due
to the imbalanced contractual rights among the parties.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
1333-34
247.
248.
249.
250.

413 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 843 n.1.
Id. at 843-44 & 843 n. 1.
Id. at 844 n.4.
Id.; see also Sperling v. Davie, 41 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1949).
Greenstein, 413 So. 2d at 844 n.4; Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330,
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
18 So. 3d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. (quoting Hackett v. J.R.L. Dev., Inc., 566 So. 2d 601,603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
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It should be noted that other states have also embraced the concept that an
illusory promise can render a contract or clause in a contract to be unenforceable,
albeit in different factual contexts. 251 The court in Reeves v. Memorial Terrace,
Ltd.252 addressed illusory promises involving a contract with terms that made the
buyer's promise to purchase land illusory.25 3 In Reeves, the court noted that for
a contract to be enforceable, it "must be supported by valid consideration, 254i.e.,
mutuality of obligation," which "can consist of an exchange of promises.,
However, if a promise fails to actually bind a party because he retains
the option to terminate the transaction in lieu of performing it, then the
promise is illusory and is not valid consideration. Therefore, when
illusory promises are all that support a purported bilateral contract, there
is no contract.255
Although there is no direct power to terminate the agreement at any time in our
paradigm situation, this Article argues that when the sale remedy upon breach is
merely the refund of the buyer's earnest money, the seller has created a power to
terminate the agreement at any time, thereby making the seller's promises of
performance illusory.
In summary, Florida, more than other states, protects home buyers from
grossly unfair limitation-of-remedies clauses for two reasons. The first is the
different legal standard Florida applies to limitation-of-liability clauses than other
jurisdictions. Florida courts will not enforce limitation-of-remedies clauses when
they are shown to be "unreasonable," while other courts require the much higher
standard of "unconscionable" for such clauses to be unenforceable. 6 Second,
Florida courts better recognize the "non-remedy" nature of the "remedy" of
returning to the non-breaching party its own money and find contracts that
provide this as the sole remedy to be illusory in nature. 7 This thereby permits
the courts to refrain from enforcing the clause. Viewing such clauses as creating
an illusory agreement has also enabled Florida courts to refrain from enforcing
the clause when the buyer has breached and also to relegate the seller to a remedy

251. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a (1981) ("Illusory
promises. Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the
'promisor' do not constitute a promise."). See id. illus. 2 ("A promises B to act as B's agent for
three years from a future date on certain terms; B agrees that A may so act, but reserves the power
to terminate the agreement at any time. B's agreement is not consideration, since it involves no
promise by him.").
252. Reeves v. Memorial Terrace, Ltd., No. 14-02-0633-CV, 2004 WL 2933807 (Tex. App.
Ct. Dec. 21, 2004).
253. Id. at *1-2.
254. Id. at *1.
255. Id. (internal citation omitted).
256. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Hole No. 4, LLC, No. 2:06-cv-00679, 2007 WL 2221066, at *1012 (D. Utah July 31,2007); Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
257. Warren, 476 So. 2d at 1333.
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of actual damages rather than liquidated damages when the liquidated damages
amount was higher.258
In light of the results from the two empirical studies described in Part I and
the Remedies Experiment detailed in Part II, the approach of requiring that
limitation-of-remedies clauses be reasonable in order to be enforceable makes
much more sense than the approach of applying the very difficult to meet
unconscionability test. The unconscionability test makes sense when there has
been a true bargain between parties who understood the terms of the contract.
When this has not occurred, courts still engage in this fiction of analyzing
unconscionability in order to further the goal of creating certainty of contracts
and to encourage parties to refrain from entering into contracts when they do not
understand what they are agreeing to.259 But in light of the widespread use of
highly unfair limitation-of-remedies clauses evidenced in the two empirical
studies, the likely lack of bargaining over such clauses in light of the profound
lack of consumer understanding of them, as evidenced in the Remedies
Experiment (with participants being overly optimistic that they still had remedies
available to them notwithstanding clear language to the contrary-clear at least
to a lawyer),260 it is imperative that courts take this reality into account and apply
the Florida approach or other protective approaches described in Part IV.
IV. LEGAL REFORMS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF
DYSFUNCTIONAL CONTRACTS

This Article proposes
four law reforms to reduce the problem of
26
"dysfunctional contracts." '
A. Modify the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law Rules
Entering into a contract to purchase a home is the single largest and most
important transaction that most consumers will enter into,262 and such contracts
typically cover, in a highly technical fashion, a myriad of legal issues that can
arise both before and after the closing.263 Yet many states do not require an
attorney to represent homebuyers for the purpose of reviewing and proposing

258. See, e.g., Hackett v. J.R.L. Dev., Inc., 566 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Idevco,
Inc. v. Hobaugh, 571 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
259. See, e.g., Morales v. Sun Contractors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221-23 (3d Cir. 2008); Shelton
v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., 550 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80-81 (D.D.C. 2008).
260. Remedies Experiment, supra note 8.
261. By "dysfunctional contracts" we mean contracts where the professional seller's form
limits the seller's liability for its breach of the contract to return of the buyer's earnest money and
reserves to the seller far more significant fights in the event of the buyer's default, such as retention
of this earnest money.
262. See Braunstein & Genn, supranote 10, at 470 n.4 (stating that 132 of the homebuyers
surveyed in the Columbus area "said that their house was the most valuable asset they owned").
263. Debra Pogrund Stark, Navigating Residential Attorney Approvals: Finding a Better
JudicialNorth Star, 39 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 171, 178-85 (2006).
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changes to the form contract to protect the buyer's expectations and goals, 26 as
is more commonly done in Illinois and a few other states.265 One important
reason 266 for the prevailing practice of home buyers' reliance on brokers for
assistance, rather than lawyers, is that, in many states, the rules on the
unauthorized practice of law permit brokers to fill in standard form purchase and
sale contracts without the assistance of an attorney.26 7 It is thus customary for

264. See infra note 267 and accompanying text for examples of states that permit brokers to
fill in form purchase contracts. When brokers are permitted to fill in form purchase contracts-a
task which is arguably incident to their role in helping to bring the buyer and seller together-it is
in the broker's interest to not have an attorney review and approve the contract because the attorney
may raise points that delay the deal or even cause the deal to not go through. Consequently, brokers
are not likely to encourage the buyer to hire an attorney at this stage, unless the brokers would incur
liability for failing to do so. Based on data collected in an empirical study in Columbus, Ohio 59%
of homebuyers interviewed indicated that they did not hire an attorney to represent them.
Braunstein & Genn, supra note 10, at 471.
265. See Stark, supra note 263, at 188 n.39 (noting eleven states where there is case law on
the use of attorney approval clauses in residential deals).
266. Another important reason is that some attorneys fail to properly review the purchase
agreement with the buyer as they should, causing home buyers to justifiably not see any value in
spending the money to hire an attorney. The homebuyers in the empirical study in Columbus, Ohio,
provided two main reasons for choosing not to hire an attorney: (i) the costs for the attorney (with
some expressing it would be "a waste of money") and (ii) because "other person[s] in the
transaction performed the role of, or obviated the need for, a lawyer." Braunstein & Genn, supra
note 10, at 472.
267. See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998,401-02,421-22
(Colo. 1957) (en banc) (holding it would be "unrealistic and impractical" for lawyers to have to
complete all real estate sales transactions); Pope Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Suggs, 624 S.W.2d 828,830-31
(Ark. 1981) (holding that the preparation ofreal estate purchase contracts are so "indigenous to the
practice of law that it would be illogical to say they are not. But we can also say, as a majority of
other jurisdictions have done, that it is in the public interest to permit the limited, outside use of
standard, printed forms in the manner stipulated by the chancellor and we so hold."); The Fla. Bar
v. Irizarry, 268 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 1972) ("[W]e have limited the permissible scope of activities
of real estate brokers to preliminary negotiations and preparation of the contract."); Cardinal v.
Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 864, 866-67 (Minn. 1988) ("The provisions of [the
Minnesota statute] shall not prohibit... any one, acting as broker for the parties or agent of one
the parties to a sale ...of... property... from drawing or assisting in drawing, with or without
charge, papers incident to the sale."); Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Mo. 1952) ("[W]hen
acting as broker, a realtor may use an earnest money contract form for the protection of either party
against unreasonable withdrawal from the transaction, provided that such earnest money contract
form, as well as any other standard legal forms used by the broker in transacting such business, shall
first have been approved and promulgated for such use by the bar association and the real estate
board in the locality where the forms are to be used."); Calvert v. K. Hovnanian at Galloway, VI,
Inc., 607 A.2d 156, 160 (N.J. 1992) ("The Bar Association and the Association of Realtors finally
agreed to a settlement that permitted licensed realtors receiving commissions for the sale of
residential real estate to prepare the contracts for those sales provided that each contract contain a
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real estate brokers to use the standard form contract prepared by the developer,
fill in the blanks of the form contract, such as the purchase price, loan numbers,
and closing date, but not provide legal advice on the contract.268 Some courts
have permitted this due to a failure to appreciate the important rights that can be
eradicated through a contract that a well-trained attorney would identify and
address but a broker would not.269 But some courts, such as the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, have expressed an appreciation for the important rights and
obligations that a real estate purchase agreement creates but concluded that, since
there is no evidence of how the public is, in fact, harmed when not represented
by an attorney,27 ° the court would not prevent brokers from assisting home buyers

clause making the contract subject to review by an attorney for the buyer or seller at either party's
option within three business days after execution."); In re Duncan & Hill Realty, Inc. v. Dep't of
State, 62 A.D.2d 690, 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) ("As long as real estate brokers and agents have
not held themselves out to be attorneys at law, have confined their actions to serving their clients
in relation to the specific transaction (such as drawing a contract of sale) in which the broker has
a financial interest for payment of his services, and have made no charge for these incidental
services, such acts have been held by our courts to be proper and not to constitute the unlawful
practice of law."); Or. State Bar v. Sec. Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334, 340 (Or. 1962) (finding that
an exception from the injunction is "the filling-in of blanks under the direction of a customer upon
a form or forms selected by a customer. If the customer does not know what forms to use or how
to direct their completion, then he needs legal advice. If the customer does know what he wants
and how he wants it done, he needs only a scribener"); see also Creditors' Serv. Corp. v.
Cummings, 190 A. 2, 12-13 (R.I. 1937); Bar Ass'n of Tenn., Inc. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co.,
326 S.W.2d 767, 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959); Perkins v. CTX Mortgage Co., 969 P.2d 93, 99
(Wash. 1999) (en banc).
268. See, e.g., Pope Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Suggs, 624 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Ark. 1981) ("[T]he
broker shall not give advice or opinions as to the legal rights of the parties, as to the legal effects
of instruments to accomplish specific purposes or as to the validity of title to real estate."); State
ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 268 N.W. 95, 96 (Neb. 1936) (permitting a non-lawyer to draft
documents-acting "merely as an amanuensis"--but who does not provide advice "or counsel as
to the legal effect and validity of [legal] instruments").
269. See Chi. Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771, 773-74 (I11.
1966)
(distinguishing filling in blanks on a deed or other documents that "affect titles to real estate
[which) have many points to consider" with filling in blanks ("such as the date, price, name of the
purchaser, location of the property, date of giving possession and duration of the offer") or making
"appropriate deletions ...to conform to the facts" in a purchase and sale contract that "is
customarily used in the community" since such services "require no more than ordinary business
intellingence [sic] and do not require the skill peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law").
It is hard to understand why the court understood how "the mere filling in of the blanks" can be
more complicated than it appears in a deed affecting title, but not in a contract form that affects the
parties rights and obligations between each other. Id. at 774.
270. See Inre Opinion No. 26 of the Comm., 654 A.2d 1344, 1345-46, 1359 (N.J. 1995) (per
curiam). The court also noted the cost savings to the homebuyer when the broker fills in the form
contract as contrasted with the buyer paying to have an attorney do so. Id. at 1360.
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in the use of a form purchase contract. 27 Two prior studies, one by a special
master at the direction of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 272 and the other by
Professor Joyce Palomar, who focused on the impact of an attorney at the
conveyance stage rather than at the contracting stage,273 failed to show how
having non-attorneys assist buyers in their home purchase transactions negatively
impacts the public. These studies and the lack of a showing of public harm has
led, in part, to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
taking the position that allowing laypersons to perform tasks involved in
residential real estate transactions is unlikely to increase the risk of harm for
consumers and should be permitted.274 Consequently, the results from the
Remedies Experiment2 75 and the Condo Contracts Study2 76 are important
contributions for the question of public harm and the rules relating to the
unauthorized practice of law.
Based on the results from the Remedies Experiment, it is clear that most
consumers, even if they carefully read the limitation-of-remedies clause in the
277
contracts presented to them, will not understand what rights they have waived
and will not know to bargain for revision of the clause or to bargain to add an
attorneys' fees clause to the contract. One way to address this major problem is
to change the unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") rules to prohibit brokers
from filling in the blanks of a purchase and sale agreement, which should lead
more buyers to seek out an attorney to assist them with this task. State law could
require these forms to state at the top that "this legal document will have a major
impact on the buyer's rights and obligations," and "the buyer should consult with
an attorney before signing the agreement." States could go even further and
require that prospective home buyers hire an attorney to review and advise them
on the purchase and sale agreement before the buyer can be bound by the
agreement (such as requiring an attorney review/approval clause). In light of the
results from our Attorney Survey, which reflects, among other things, that in 110% of the deals a major dispute arises between the parties after the contract is
signed and that the contract language is likely to have an essential impact on the
rights and obligations of the parties relevant to this dispute, empirical evidence

271. Id. at 1361-62. Furthermore, when attorneys fail to spot problems with how a transaction
is structured and documented and fail to negotiate for changes to reduce these problems, or fail to
inform their client of these problems, their clients justifiably see no added value in hiring an
attorney and only see the added costs in doing so.
272. In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm., 654 A.2d at 1351.
273. Joyce Palomar, The WarBetween Attorneys andLay Conveyancers-EmpiricalEvidence
Says "CeaseFire!," 31 CONN. L. REv. 423, 520 (1999).
274. Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Mo. L. REV.
1031, 1062-66 (2007).
275. See Remedies Experiment, supra note 8. See infra Part II.B.
276. See Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
277. Remedies Experiment, supranote 8. Indeed, as noted in Part II, many participants appear
not to recognize the possibility of recovering benefit of the bargain/expectation damages or
consequential damages and expressed skepticism that this is a recoverable loss. Id.
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now supports the proposition that homebuyers clearly are harmed when not
represented by a well-trained attorney.2 78 We therefore propose a companion rule
to the change in the UPL laws that would mandate use of an attorney by a home
purchaser. The UPL rules should also require that only attorneys who have
undergone special training and additional licensing for this type of representation
can represent buyers of homes related to this area of practice. This would better
ensure that home purchasers receive real value if they are required to hire an
attorney to protect their interests.
B. EnactLegislation That ProhibitsRemedies Clauses That Limit Buyers'
Remedies to Return of EarnestMoney and Create Safe HarborRules Based
on Mutuality of Remedy and True Bargaining
Unfortunately, even if assisted by very able counsel, such attorneys might not
be successful in negotiating for revisions to the typical limitation-of-remedies
clauses used by developers, especially if it happens to be a seller's market.279
Thus, even with a reform of the UPL rules, state legislators should consider
legislation that prohibits the one-sided type remedy clauses focused on in this
Article. The question then arises of what would be an acceptable limitation-ofremedies clause under the statute, i.e., examples of "safe harbors." For example,
is it adequate protection to enforce limitation-of-remedies clauses but create a
"bad faith" exception to enforcement when the developer is breaching to take
advantage of property appreciation? We do not think so for reasons articulated
earlier. What if the limitation-of-remedies clause awards the buyer her out-ofpocket expenses, but at a very low or nominal figure? Should that be
enforceable? It is difficult to anticipate and address each possible scenario that
can arise and a goal, other than protecting buyers, is to create rules that are both
clear in scope and permit true bargaining to occur. To accomplish this, laws
could create safe harbors based upon the concept of mutuality-meaning if the
remedies clause is truly mutual then it would be considered a safe harbor. An
example would be mutual liquidating damages clauses (seller retains 5% of the
purchase price if buyer breaches, and buyer is entitled to 5% of the purchase
price if seller breaches), or mutual rights to specific performance, provided the
seller can provide marketable title, or reserving to both parties all rights and
remedies available at law or in equity. We advocate creating legislation that
prohibits the type of limitation-of-remedies clause focused on in this
Article-where the buyer's sole remedy is return of the buyer's earnest money,
even with interest on it-but also creates safe harbors based on specific examples
of acceptable mutual remedies. A court would judge the enforceability of any
limitation-of-remedies clause that does not fit within the parameters of what is
expressly prohibited or expressly permitted as a safe harbor under a test that

278. Attorney Survey, supra note 20.
279. See id.Only 35% of the attorneys in the Attorney Survey rated themselves as successful
in negotiating highly problematic or highly unfair terms in a professional seller's purchase contract
form greater than 50% of the time.
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determines the reasonableness of the limitation-of-remedies clause under the
circumstances (the Florida approach). Major factors in this determination could
be whether the buyer truly bargained over the clause, whether the buyer had an
attorney representing her, and whether the buyer had a true choice between
accepting a limitation-of-remedies that is not mutual in exchange for other
valuable consideration (such as a reduction in the purchase price) or the right to
decline this other valuable consideration and enjoy a mutual limitation-ofremedies clause instead.
C. Replace Substantive UnconscionabilityTest With a "Reasonable
Limitation of Remedy " Test in the Home PurchaseContext
Although legislation is preferable to purejudicial response to the problem of
dysfunctional contracts because of legislation's ability to more clearly and
comprehensively address the problem than the judiciary, courts need to better
protect home purchasers from highly unfair limitation-of-remedies clauses if
legislatures fail to enact protections. Courts should replace the near impossible
to meet test of substantive unconscionability with the test of whether the
limitation-of-remedies clause, under the circumstances, is "reasonable." Courts
could look to factors such as mutuality and true bargaining, articulated above, in
determining whether the clause is reasonable. All courts already engage in a test
of reasonableness in enforcing liquidated damages clauses, so applying a
reasonableness test in the context of limitations of remedies would not be
unprecedented, as Florida courts already apply this approach to limitation-ofremedies clauses.
D. Enact Legislation RequiringAttorney's Fees to the Buyer When She Is the
PrevailingParty in Enforcing Her Rights in the Context
of a Home PurchaseAgreement
The reform of requiring attorneys' fees to the buyer when the prevailing
party in a lawsuit to enforce the home purchase agreement is critical because
without it, even if the home buyer would have a valid claim for meaningful
damages against a breaching seller, the buyer will unlikely be able to afford
litigating the claim. This is because the costs of proving one's case in litigation
are typically very high.28 ° As noted in Part II, 71% of the participants in the
clearly unfair condition and 76% in the vaguely unfair condition mistakenly
believed there were no laws of remedies that would prevent their recovering of
attorneys' fees for handling the litigation to enforce the contract."' 1 They did not
realize that this right must be in the contract or in a statute for them to recover.
Yet, as noted in Part I, only 14% of the contracts in the Condo Contracts Study
contained an attorneys' fees provision to the prevailing party in the event of a
lawsuit to enforce the agreement.282 This Article also recommends enacting

280. See O'CONNELL, supra note 17.
281. Remedies Experiment, supra note 8.
282. Condo Contracts Study, supra note 1.
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legislation that would prohibit the developer/seller from being able to recover
attorney's fees as a result from defending a lawsuit brought by the buyer, unless
the court rules the buyer's suit to be frivolous; prior research reflects that fewer
consumers will bring meritorious claims if their contract contains a provision
permitting the recovery of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.283 In light of
the foregoing, states should enact legislation to require that this type of clause be
added to the form purchase agreements to ensure that all buyers will have this
right and will realize they have this right if a dispute arises.
CONCLUSION

The results from the Condo Contract Study reflect that the vast majority of
form contracts used by condominium developers in the jurisdiction examined
contain a limitation-of-remedies clause that is completely one-sided, patently
unreasonable, and that causes the seller's obligations under the contract to be
illusory in nature unless "saved" with an implied "bad faith" exception.284 Yet
based on a review of relevant case law, it appears that many courts will still
enforce this type of clause when it is clearly provided for and, therefore,
presumably bargained for.285 But in order to bargain for a contract term, one
must at least understand it. Consequently, this Article examined how well
laypersons in fact understand this prevalent type of limitation-of-remedies clause
by assigning one group to afair remedies clause condition (where both parties
have reserved all rights and remedies under the law in the event of a breach), a
second group to a clearly unfairremedies clause (where the buyer's sole remedy
in the event of seller's breach is return of the buyer's own earnest money and the
seller's remedy, in the event of the buyer's breach, is retention of that earnest
money), and a third group to a vaguely unfairremedies clause (where the buyer's
sole remedy is limited to return of buyer's earnest money but the clause does not
expressly state this occurs in the case of the seller's breach). The results of this
Remedies Experiment reflected a profound misunderstanding of the impact of the
two unfair remedies clauses with, for example, 64% in the clearly unfair
condition and 68% in the vaguely unfair condition mistakenly believing they
could still seek specific performance if the seller breached the contract, and 54%
in the clearly unfair condition and 60% in the vaguely unfair condition
mistakenly believing that they could recover certain out-of-pocket expenses in
the event of the seller's breach. These results, and the others detailed in Part II,
demonstrate that courts truly engage in a fiction when they presume that
consumers understand clearly worded limitation-of-remedies clauses (clear at
least to attorneys and judges) and, therefore, conclude that the judiciary should
enforce these clauses because they have been bargained for. In light of this
reality, we argue that home purchasers need greater protections than they

283. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does FraudPay?An EmpiricalAnalysisof
Attorneys Fees Provisionsin ConsumerFraudStatutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 483,508-09 (2008).
284. See supra Part III for a discussion of case law.
285. Id.
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currently enjoy and identify four areas of legal reform to better protect such
home purchasers: (i) revise the unauthorized practice of law rules to mandate
attorney review and approval of home purchase contracts, further requiring such
attorneys to be specially trained and licensed for this type of representation, (ii)
enact legislation that prohibits remedies clauses that limit buyers' remedies to
return of earnest money and create safe harbor rules based on mutuality of
remedy and true bargaining in the home purchase contract, (iii) replace the
substantive unconscionability test with a "reasonable limitation of remedy" test
in the home purchase context for limitation-of-remedies clauses, and (iv) enact
legislation requiring attorneys' fees to the buyer when the prevailing party in the
context of enforcing rights in a home purchase agreement.

